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Abstract
Today, the challenge of economy regarding freight transport is to generate flows
of goods extremely fast, handling information in short times, optimizing decisions,
and reducing the percentage of vehicles that circulate empty over the total amount
of transportation means, with benefits to roads congestion and the environment,
besides economy. Logistic operators need to pose attention on suitable planning
methods in order to reduce their costs, fuel consumption and emissions, as well as
to gain economy of scale. To ensure the maximum efficacy, planning should be also
based on cooperation between the involved subjects. Collaboration in logistics is
an effective approach for business to obtain a competitive edge. In a successful
collaboration, parties involved from suppliers, customers, and even competitors
perform a coordinated effort to realize the potential benefit of collaboration,
including reduced costs, decreased lead times, and improved asset utilization and
service level. In addition to these benefit, having a broader supply chain perspective
enables firms to make better-informed decisions on strategic issues.
The first aim of the present Thesis is to propose a planning approach based on
mathematical programming techniques to improve the efficiency of road services of
a single carrier combining multiple trips in a port environment (specifically, import,
export and inland trips). In this way, in the same route, more than two transportation
services can be realized with the same vehicle thus significantly reducing the number
of total empty movements. Time windows constraints related to companies and
terminal opening hours as well as to ship departures are considered in the problem
formulation. Moreover, driving hours restrictions and trips deadlines are taken into
account, together with goods compatibility for matching different trips.
The second goal of the Thesis is to define innovative planning methods and
optimization schemes of logistic networks in which several carriers are present and
the decisional actors operate in a cooperative scenario in which they share a portion
of their demand. The proposed approaches are characterized by the adoption both of
Game Theory methods and of new original methods of profits distribution.
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Chapter 1
Outline of the Thesis
The arrival of mega-ships is having a profound effect on port operations and represents a
challenge for ports in several ways. They have to cope with a much higher variability in delivery
volumes, as one big vessel unloads much more freight. This creates demand for sufficient
intermediate storage space, not only space for containers but also plug-ins for cooling and
refrigerated containers, and tank storage for liquid bulk or dry bulk storage. Investments in
more freight handling equipment will be necessary. Onward forwarding and distribution of cargo
becomes a logistical challenge, possibly requiring additional rail and road capacity into a port.
Mega-ships even have an impact on ports that can’t handle them. Shippers might relocate their
business to ports that can be served by mega-ships and agreement between them is necessary.
The main beneficiaries of big ships are supposed to be container shipping lines but mega vessel
have filled ship overcapacity that has depressed freight rates and profit margins of shipping line.
In that way collaboration between shipping companies has been useful to fill big vessels and
making the service profitable both for the owner of the vessel and for the tenant. As container
transport volume continues to grow, the links with the hinterland will become a critical factor the
entire supply chain to effectively operate.
The access to the hinterland is a key success factor for the ports, which aim to enhance the
quality of hinterland transport services [22]. To reach an adequate accessibility, as stated by
[12], coordination and cooperation between a large group of actors is required. Ports and their
hinterland transport systems can attract more volumes if the whole hinterland transport network
is effective and efficient.
Italian infrastructures are already very close to their maximum capacity and with the arrival of big
vessels the situation will get worse. This yields the necessity of increasing the effectiveness of
the road transport for which one of the main issues towards rationalization and optimization is the
minimization of unproductive trips. This can be beneficial, apart from an economic standpoint,
also from an environmental point of view in terms of congestion and air pollution reduction.
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A way to optimize road transport could be by organizing and planning road services in order
to avoid empty way back also through collaboration between stakeholders realizing efficient
collaboration.
So, the contribution of this study is to merge the multiple trips combination problem, based on
collaborative mechanisms between partners, and the distribution of costs and profits to guarantee
the best revenue for all the members of the coalition.
As will be further explained, collaboration can be realized into two directions: vertical and
horizontal. During these years of studies the focus was mostly on horizontal collaboration. In
the first case the collaboration is realized across different and heterogeneous levels of the supply
chain and the aim is to integrate all the actors in a common agreement. In the case of horizontal
collaboration we refer to collaboration among logistics operators at the same level, such as
trucks operators or shippers. Partners share networks and fleets and could resort to multiple
trips combination to service all the transport demand in order to optimize the general demand
of transport. In particular, horizontal cooperation is proven to be effective in terms of costs
reduction and improving logistics qualities but applications are still rare. The major responsible
of this gap is the lack of a proper collaboration model, especially for what concerns costs/gains
distribution. Therefore, any proposed mechanism to manage the collaboration’s activities should
yield collectively and individually desirable solutions.
At the highest level, developing a successful collaboration involves two primary tasks:
identifying and exploiting synergies between individuals, and allocating the resulting benefits
among the collaborators. Benefits depend on interactions between participants and identifying
and exploiting synergies often involve solving complex optimization problems and thus may be
quite challenging. Benefits could be dived in qualitative and quantitative. We refer to qualitative
benefits as social and prestige advantages in consequence of the alliance with other partners,
and are never sharable, while quantitative benefits could be sharable or not sharable. When a
quantitative benefit is sharable has to be used a proper sharing method to redistribute benefits
among participants and it is a crucial moment of the alliance because it must ensure that the
benefits gained by each entity make the collaboration acceptable for every one and more attractive
than single operability. When a quantitative benefit of the collaboration is not sharable the
distribution of profits could be based on the addition of constraints such as trips deadline to
ensure acceptable delivery reductions for each member.
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1.1 Motivation of the Research
Road transport often lacks adequate infrastructures as well as a proper organization and planning.
Therefore, a rationalization and optimization of road transportation may help improving the
performance of freight transportation networks, possibly also increasing the number of delivered
containers.
As stated in [55], the real keys to creating an effective road transport, and more in general an
effective logistic chain, is to get the right balance between customer service and costs, this
implies to manage and consider the following elements:
- Assets. Road freight transport fleets consist of some very high-value assets, ranging from
tractors, trailers and rigid vehicles themselves to the drivers. Computer routing, scheduling
packages and fleet management packages offer real opportunities to monitor very closely
the costs and utilization of these assets. Both time and space (or load) utilization are
important considerations.
- Service. Delivery transport acts as the main physical interface with the customer, so
it is important that all customer service requirements are met. For transport, important
requirements involve delivering within set delivery windows and meeting specific delivery
times. Once again, computer routing and scheduling packages are key to achieving these
goals.
- Costs. As well as the major assets discussed above, there are also costs associated with
the operation of the vehicle, specifically the running costs such as fuel and tyres. Good
scheduling can also help to keep these costs to a minimum.
- Maintenance. It is important to ensure that vehicles are maintained on a regular basis to
reduce the occurrence of breakdowns, which can lead to both a loss of service and a higher
operational cost.
- Driver management. This can be significantly improved by the use of appropriate
tachograph analysis. As well as providing a better and more accurate picture of fleet
efficiency, tachograph output can be used to monitor the detailed effectiveness of individual
drivers.
- Replacement. A key decision for any transport manager is to be able to identify when
vehicles need to be replaced and also which type of vehicle is the most effective for the
particular type of operation that is being undertaken. A good fleet management system
will be able to provide this information.
- Security and tracking. Modern technology allows for the real-time tracking of vehicles.
This enables up-to-the-minute information to be provided to schedulers and to customers,
so can help to improve operational effectiveness, security and service.
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In this context, we found out that one of the main drawbacks of ineffective planning of road
transport activities is the necessity of performing a significant number of empty trips [1], i.e.,
movements realized by vehicles without a load (which means loaded with an empty container).
Empty trips are unproductive movements since they are not profitable and they also produce
negative externalities on road networks, as they contribute to increase congestion phenomena and
environmental pollution. The realization of empty trips may be due to an improper organization
of transportation activities, but it is also often induced by the so-called “round trip” operating
mode [70]. This mode refers to the case in which a truck, performing a trip from an origin point
to a destination point to transfer one full container, is constrained to come back to the origin
of the trip carrying back the empty container. Without a proper planning, the round trip mode
frequently yields empty trips. Round trips are very common mainly due to the competition in the
inland transport sector between freight forwarders and shipping companies. In fact, even if in
this Thesis the case in which freight forwarders are in charge of the inland transport organization
and management (that is the “merchant haulage” case is considered, as opposed to the “carrier
haulage” one in which shipping lines take care of inland transportation), the decision of where to
bring back the empty container is imposed by shipping companies that are the usual owners of
containers. In fact, with the goal of dominating the inland transport sector, shipping companies
usually oblige road carriers to bring back their empty containers to the trip origins.
The two main objectives of the present Thesis are to optimize trips route through multiple
trips combination and to analyze the opportunities and challenges of collaboration in logistics
services, in particular between trucks carriers.
These goals arise from the consideration that according to Eurostat studies, the trucking industry
is the principal service of transports for goods in our nation (73% of the total amount), due
to its intrinsic characteristics, such as easy territory penetration and flexibility. Nevertheless
the statistics presented by Eurostat shows the inefficiency of the vehicle utilization, which is
unsatisfactory for both own account and outsourced fleets, because about 24% of all road freight
kilometers driven in the European Union are by empty vehicles. The European Environment
Agency shows also that the average vehicle is loaded to 56% of its capacity in terms of weight.
All of these factors make road transport the sector with the lowest profit margin mainly due to
high operating costs.
This aspect with highly fragmented industry structure and intense competition has forced many
small trucking companies out of business. Collaboration means sharing networks, transport
demand and resources and also create optimal routes that maximize trucks utilization and avoid
empty trips. Multiple trips combination could be adopted to plan more efficient routes and
game theory, based on common rules, could be the solution for cost/savings distribution between
partners.
So, in this Thesis exact mathematical approaches for combining multiple trips and allocate profits
plus the application of game theory to share costs and benefits are presented. The innovation from
previous works stands in the fact that, in the same route, more nodes can be visited, by combining
14
up to four trips and considering hard time constraints such as working hours restriction for
drivers, that until now, according to our knowledge, have been solved only through heuristic
methods.
The models are related to the context of tactical/ operative planning and truck operators own the
problem of trips combination.
The expectation is that the present Thesis will give an overview of the benefits related to transport
optimization that can tempt road transport operators to implement collaboration and integration.
Summary of the contribution follows:
- Firstly, we identified the problem of empty trucks movements in the containerized transport
and decided to focus on a mathematical model able to combine import, export and inland
trips, with a general number of two trips combined into the same route;
- Secondly, to better distribute trips we extended the study to a collaborative environment,
where participants could share trips, in order to achieve higher profits and realize a more
performing route planning. We modeled horizontal collaboration as cooperative games,
investigate coalition formation and gain sharing issues, and then propose a set of generally
applicable gain-sharing mechanisms that consider players’ contribution.
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1.2 Research Methodology
The multiple trips combination and horizontal collaboration have been investigated
through a deep literature review both of research papers and practical cases. In
particular, to make more significant the knowledge process of the sea port traffic and its
consequences on road hinterland activities, specific courses on port issues and interviews
with logistics operators have been carried out, in order to understand the real context of
road containerized transport and to validate the models proposed in this Thesis.
The Multiple Trip Combination Problem presents some analogies with the class of Vehicle
Routing Problems (VRPs) in which the optimal set of paths (routes) for a set of vehicles
having to serve a set of points on a network is sought. An extensive literature is available
for VRPs [9]. The problem considered in this work may be seen as a VRP but it
differentiates in some aspects due to special requirements coming from real case studies.
In the following subsection, an overview of the versions of VRPs which present the highest
analogies with the problem under concern is provided, with a discussion of the common
points and most significant differences with respect to it.
As regards the realization of collaboration between truck companies, the applications are
still rare and mainly solved with simple game theory approaches or ad hoc method.
The outcome points out the need to adopt a method that simultaneously combines trips
of multiple carriers and assigns costs and gains in a proper way. The multiple trips
combination problem is solved applying an original Mixed Integer Linear Programming
optimization problem (MILP) while the cost and profits allocations between partners
is addressed applying well known Game theory methods and an original mathematical
method formulated during the PhD.
To the best of our knowledge, the work here proposed is significantly different from the
current existing approaches in literature. The novelty proposed stands in the approach
utilized that simultaneously takes into consideration hard time constraints related to
node time windows and soft time constraints related to trip deadlines, EU driving
hour constraints, containerized goods feature that rarely are taken into account and the
importance given to the proper allocation of saving and gains to carriers partners that join
the coalition.
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1.3 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to some basic aspect of the supply chain, focusing on
containerized logistic. A description of the historical growth of container transport is
followed by an assessment of its importance throughout the world. An outlook of the
world economy and containerized economy is provided, with a focus on European
and Italian traffics.
In Chapter 3, the problem of the containerized truck transport inefficiencies is described.
The possibility of combining trips is exploited to maximize the cost savings obtained
with respect to non optimized cases. After an explicit literature review that
defines the work originality, a mathematical problem is stated and solved within
different optimization schemes whose comparison is addressed. Some real typical
requirements as the presence of multiple ports, node time windows, trip due-dates,
cargo features and EU driving rules constraints are considered. To prove the validity
of the proposed approaches, various scenarios are compared by using real data
provided by Italian transport operators.
In Chapter 4 the topic of cooperation in the chain logistic chain is exploited. More in
detail, the horizontal cooperation among truck carriers is the framework considered
in the present chapter. Horizontal collaboration drivers and barriers are identified and
a literature review on collaboration is proposed. The exploration of the literature is
focused both on cooperative game theory and on other mechanisms of profit and cost
sharing among alliances’ participants.
In Chapter 5 the problem of the profits’ distribution among truck carrier operators in
collaboration settings is addressed. The goal of this chapter is to properly distribute
gains related to a set of carriers collaborating together after merging multiple trips
applying model described in Chapter 3. The way in which the overall profit is,
then, allocated to the different carriers, thus determining carrier individual profits,
is analyzed by using an original mathematical model able to assign both combined
and single trips to carriers. This second optimization problem is solved several times
for different number of carriers participating to the coalition in order to determine the
best coalition size. To analyze the efficiency of the proposed mechanism, the profit
distribution is solved also applying five game theory (GT) allocation methods. An
experimental campaign based on real data sets has been performed to validate the
proposed approaches. Various instances considering different number of trips and
different values of the coalition management cost have been analyzed.
Chapter 6 concludes the Thesis indicating the goals achieved and the future perspectives
in the horizontal collaboration framework of truck carrier operators.
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Chapter 2
Introduction
The history of transportation and logistic is as long as the history of mankind.
Studying the etymology of the word “Logistic” it could be deduced that it comes
from the greek term “logikos” that means “that has a logical sense” and its primary
root “logos” could be translated both as “word” and “order”. The first application of
this term could be found within military organizations, it was the branch of military
science and operations dealing with the procurement, supply, and maintenance of
equipment, with the movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel, with the
provision of facilities and services, and with related matters. The military meaning of
logistic was maintained till the second world war, where the logistic efforts reached
a global scale. Logistics’ expansion towards other sectors, was formulated at the
beginning of 50’s, when the relevance of the products’ transport was compared
to their production. In the 80’s the concept of logistic shifted from an aggregate
sequence of events to and integration of activities with higher performance levels.
At 2000’s, could be settled the modern definition that applies to most industry
and defines logistics as the efficient transfer of goods from the source of supply
through the place of manufacture to the point of consumption in a cost-effective
way whilst providing an acceptable service to the customer. The introduction of
cloud computing Softwareas a-Service (SaaS) and Business-Processes-as-a- Service
(BPaaS) in the 2010’s rounds out the logistics of today. Today, demanding customers,
complex supply chain and ever-changing relationships with third-party logistics
(3PL’s) providers are prompting supply chain management professionals to closely
examine the adaptability and agility of their logistics networks, because logistics will
play an ever-greater role in delivering high-performing results
It is useful, at this point, to consider logistics in the context of business and the
economy as a whole. Logistics is an important activity making extensive use of the
human and material resources that affect a national economy. Nowadays logistic,
and the broader concept of supply chain management, is mainly intended as business
function. Supply chain management gives an emphasis also on the importance of
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information and its exchange between partners, and on coordination. Distribution
or transportation management, as part of logistics, is a third layer in this framework
where physical operations and movements of cargoes are considered (see fig.2.1).
Logistics chains cover the gap between production sites and markets by choosing
warehouse locations, ports of destination, inventory policies, volume and frequency
of transport. In such a framework transportation takes place and the decision making
concerns the routing of physical flows on networks and the choice of modality ([39]).
Figure 2.1: Supply Chain Hierarchy ([39])
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2.1 Container Logistic
In the last decade, global trade and the movement of large quantities of goods are
more and more related to supply chains based on containers (i.e. container supply
chains).
To fully understand the merits and drivers of containerized cargo transport, it is
beneficial to first consider the situation as it was before the era of containerization.
As it is possible to see looking at Fig. 2.2 the manual handling operations of
individual cargo (represented with red shapes) were significant and it meant high
labour requirements that was successively translated in higher costs and less security
and integrity of the cargo items. Levinson in [17], calculated the cost of transport
of non containerized cargo in 1960 as the 25% of the total product’s costs, and port
related costs almost 50%.
Figure 2.2: Processes of cargo handling before containerization in red shape. (from [17])
The idea of a multiple use system of goods carriage is historically attributed
to Malcom McLean in 1956, to significantly reduce “time” and “costs”. It
was the attempt to reduce the duration of port stays required to load/unload a
vessel carrying break-bulk, that originally prompted Malcom McLean to introduce
dedicated container ships, thus dramatic decreasing turnaround time and determining
more efficient utilization of the expensive assets that ships are. The derived benefits
propagate throughout the entire supply chain.
The rise of world containerization is the result of the interplay of macroeconomic,
microeconomic and policy-oriented factors ([26]). Global trade favors the use
of containers and from a logistics management perspective, containers are a
challenge for both handling and transport operations. More products are moved
far greater distances because of the concentration of production facilities in low
costs manufacturing locations and because companies have developed concepts
such as focus factories, some with a single global manufacturing point for certain
products. Long-distance modes of transport have thus become much more important
to the development of efficient logistics operations that have a global perspective.
Containers have transformed carrier activity from a port-to-port to a door-to-door
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service over different transportation modes, because transshipment can be performed
easily, determining the so called “Intermodal freight transportations”.
In one of its most widely accepted meanings, intermodal freight transportations refers
to a multimodal chain of container-transportation services. In a classical example
of an intercontinental intermodal chain, loaded containers leave a shipper’s facility
by truck either directly to port or to a rail yard from where a train will deliver
them to port. A ship will move the containers from this initial port to a port on
the other continent, from where they will be delivered to the final destination by a
single or a combination of “land” transportation means: truck, rail, coastal or river
navigation. Several intermodal terminals are part of this chain, such as the initial and
final seaport container terminals, where are provided facilities between sea and land
transport. From this description is possible to summarize with three main subsystems
the intermodal container transport:
• Ocean transport;
• Sea terminals;
• Inland transport.
The container logistics, as the whole supply chain, is going through a time of rapid
and unprecedented transformation. The future of logistics is paved with innovation
and technology and one of the new trends are the Collaborative relationships, over
which we decided to pose attention in this Thesis, focusing on the truck carrier
operators, because in this subsystem could be found the deepest inefficiencies, as
will be explained in the next sections. Nevertheless, it seems to be necessary to
spend some words about each of other three subsystems that compose the intermodal
transportation to better focus on the context.
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2.1.1 Ocean Transport
The Ocean Transport is typically divided into three types: liner shipping, tramp
shipping and industrial shipping.
Liner shipping refers to regular intervals, between named ports, and offers itself as a
common carrier requiring shipment between those ports that are ready for transit by
carrier’s published dates. The rate of using the liner service is fixed by the carrier.
Tramp shipping is a contract-based service which offers services to selected
customers who have a relatively large volume of commodities to transport. The
carrier and the shipper negotiate and reach an agreement on the rate. One voyage
usually carries commodities for one shipper. It satisfies the demand for spot transit
and does not have a fixed itinerary for the long term.
Industrial shipping, also called special shipping, is characterized by its running on
regular routes using specialized ships for certain goods. Big industrial organizations
with large volumes of input materials or output products, for example, the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), represent the major
demand for industrial shipping. Industrial organizations usually cooperate and have
their own fleets or rent fleets for long periods of time in order to transport goods.
Containerized transport is mostly executed by linear shippings. Container ships have
a fixed schedule and call at several ports during a journey.
Figure 2.3 represents the density map of container ships in 2016. Key nodes are
Malacca, Panama, the Strait of Gibraltar and Suez, and traffic is denser in general
in the northern hemisphere than in the southern hemisphere, with exceptions, for
example around Santos (Brazil), South Africa and Mauritius. Some locations are
better connected than others, and it is worthwhile to understand the reasons for these
differences and options for improvement.
UNCTAD evaluates the global linear shipping network adopting a connectivity index
composed of five elements: the number of ships deployed to and from each country’s
seaports, their combined container-carrying capacity, the number of companies that
provide regular services, the number of services and the size of the largest ship. In
Fig.2.4 the index trends for the regions are illustrated: a) West Coast, South America;
b) East Coast, South America; c) African hubs; d) Eastern Africa; e) Western Asia;
f) Southern Asia; g) South East Asia; h) Eastern Asia.
Shipping industry is significantly influenced by containerization. Container ships are
the work-horses of the globalized economy: although they represent only one eighth
of the total world fleet they are essential for the transport of consumer goods around
the world. Container ships have grown bigger at a rapid pace over the last decades,
faster than any other ship type. In one decade, the average capacity of a container ship
has doubled. In 2016, 127 new containers ships were delivered (figures 2.5 and 2.6),
70% less than the peak of 2008 when the delivered ships where 436. The combined
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Figure 2.3: World Container Trade in 2017
TEU capacity amounted to less than 904 thousand TEU, a reduction by almost half,
compared with deliveries in 2015.
The trend towards gearless ships continued: Only 4.1% of delivered TEU capacity
was on ships capable of calling in ports that did not have their own ship-to-shore
container handling equipment.
Economic of scales at sea is the greatest advantage of mega container vessels. The
new building price for bigger container ship was higher than smaller one but in term
of investment per TEU, the bigger ship is less cost than the smaller ship. Moreover,
the vessel with two times bigger, not going to consume two time fuel and fuel
consumption per TEU always favors for big container ship. So, economy of scale
are achieved both in building and operating costs [74].
Mega vessels brought the drawback of the depression of freight rates and profit
matings of shipping lines due to the overcapacity. This has determined the creation of
form of mergers and acquisitions and alliances. Although there have been mergers in
recent years the major consolidation tendency has been the emergence of alliances, in
that way collaboration between shipping companies has been useful to fill big vessels
and making the service profitable both for the owner of the vessel and for the tenant.
In 2017, only three big alliances represent nearly 80% of global container trade and
roughly 90% of container capacity on major trade routes. The main trade lane that
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Figure 2.4: Linear Shipping Connectivity 2004-2017
is highly affected by this change and the main reason for the new alliances is the
North America-Asia a.k.a. “East-West” trade lane between the Far East and North
America which will represent 96% of East-West trade. These three big Ocean Carrier
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Figure 2.5: Container Ship Deliveries, 2005-2016
Figure 2.6: World Tonnage on order 2000-2017
Alliances are (Fig.2.7):
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- Alliance: CMA CGM, COSCO, OOCL, APL and Evergreen (APL is now owned
by CMA CGM);
- The Alliance: ONE, itself composed by NYK Group, MOL and K Line; Hapag
Lloyd, UASC and Yang Ming (UASC has merged with Hapag Lloyd);
- 2M Alliance: Maersk Line and MSC, with HMM and Hamburg Sud (Hamburg
Sud is now owned by Maersk Line). HMM is not officially in the alliance, but
they have slot purchases and exchanges with MSC as well as Maersk.
Figure 2.7: Freight transport modal share by country (percentage of tonne kilo metres)
The three alliances, which include the top 10 container shipping lines plus K-Line,
the fourteenth largest container shipping line in the world, collectively control 77 %
of global container ship capacity, leaving a 23 % market share for the world’s other
container shipping lines. The three alliances also control as much as 92 % of all East-
West trade. The Ocean Alliance will be the dominant player on the East-West routes,
with about 34 % of total capacity deployed on these trade routes, followed by the 2M
Alliance, with a share of 33%, and The Alliance, 26 % ([95]).
In Fig.2.8 the container ship fleet ownership in TEU are showed. Germany continues
to be the largest owner, with a market share of 21.46 %, followed by China and
Greece. The largest container ships of 17,000 TEU and above are owned by carriers
from China, Hong Kong (China), Denmark, France and Kuwait. German and
Greek shipowners, most of which are not liner shipping companies, do not own any
container ships of this size. They are primarily charter-owners, namely companies
that charter their ships out to liner companies that provide a particular shipping
service.
Maersk (Denmark) continues to be the largest liner shipping company in terms of
operated container ship capacity (3.2 million TEU), followed by MSC (Switzerland)
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Figure 2.8: Ownership of container-carrying world fleet, 2017 (Twenty-foot equivalent units)
and CMA CGM (France). Most liner shipping companies own about half the ships
they deploy on their services, while the other half is chartered in. Nevertheless should
be noted that more than 70% of the commercial fleet is registered under a flag that is
different from the country of ownership, more than 76.2 % of the world fleet tonnage
is registered in the developing countries, such as Panama, Liberia and the Marshall
Islands. However, some of the nationally flagged fleets are also nationally owned,
often because of cargo reservation regimes that limit the options for shipowners to
flag out. Many of the ships flying the flags of China, India, Indonesia and the United
States are deployed on domestic transport (cabotage) services, which are reserved for
nationally registered ships.
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2.1.2 Sea containerized terminals
Ocean containerized transports start and end at container port terminals.
The main function of a container port terminal is to provide transfer facilities for
containers between sea vessels and land transportation modes, trucks and rail in
particular. It is a highly complex system that involves numerous pieces of equipment,
operations, and container handling steps. A port terminal can be divided in three
areas:
1. The sea side area encompasses the quays where ships berth and the quay cranes
that provide the loading and unloading of containers into and from ships.
2. The yard side area, where containers are transferred to land transport modes
or are arranged to be loaded on to other ships. Two types of activities are
performed in this area: the stacking of containers and horizontal transport.
Stacking equipment for containers includes Straddle Carriers (SC), Rubber Tired
Gantry Cranes (RTGs), Rail Mounted Gantry Cranes (RMGs), Reach stackers,
and Stackers for Empty Containers. The horizontal transport between the Quay
side and yard side is performed by terminal trucks, trailers, straddle carriers or
automated guided vehicles (AGV) and reach stackers.
3. The land side area provide services for receiving/delivery operations for outside
trucks and trains
Figure 2.9 illustrates the three areas of a container port terminal.
Inside the Terminal three main cycles can be distinguished:
1. Import cycle: this cycle starts from the sea side with the arrival of the ships and
ends in the land side. The arrival time is known in advance and should respect
the dedicated berthing window, determined by commercial agreement with the
shipping lines. Successively a certain number of quay cranes are assigned to
follow the stowage sequence. Stowage sequencing determines the sequence of
unloading and loading containers, as well as the precise position each container
being loaded into the ship is to be placed in. During the unloading operation,
a quay crane transfers a container from a ship to a transporter (for instance a
straddle carrier or a trailer) that brings the container to yard area, where a yard
crane picks it up and stacks it into a given position in the yard.
2. Export cycle: this cycle starts from the land side and ends in the sea side. When
a container arrives at the gate of the terminal is firstly inspected to check for
damages and if documents are in order, then information regarding where the
container is to be stored is provided to the truck driver. Once reached the correct
yard area, a yard crane lifts the container from the truck and properly stacks
as planned. Similarly, also for a container from rail, the first phase regards
the physical and documental check, then it is picked up by a gantry crane to
a transporter that delivers it to the yard.
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Figure 2.9: Port Container Terminal Layout ([10])
3. Transshipment cycle: this cycle starts and ends in the sea side. Containers are
unloaded from a ship, temporary stored in the yard, and then reloaded into a
second vessel, without living the terminal yard.
Looking at the terminal’s activities from the Operational research perspective, several
decision problems can be identified, as these involve policies guiding the storage
block with regard to container features such as weight, sizes, country of destination,
import and export container dispatch, type of goods in the container, etc. Yard
storage space is pre-assigned to containers of each ship arriving in the near future
to maximize the productivity of the loading and unloading operations. They are
known as space allocation problems. Inbound containers are usually unloaded fast
not to delay the ship departure, but are retrieved over a long period of time compared
to the ship unloading time, in a somewhat random sequence due to uncertainties
related to importing formalities and the operations of land transportation modes. The
minimization of the number of container rehandlings is, thus, the most important
issue in this case. Pre-planning storage spaces for arriving containers will result in
less re-handlings and a more efficient ship loading operation ([27]).
Other important activities connected to the port stay of the vessels are the berth
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scheduling and quay crane assignment problems. The first one is the process of
determining the time and position at which each arriving vessel will berth. Quay-
crane allocation is the process of determining the vessel that each quay crane will
serve and the time during which the quay crane will serve the assigned vessel.
Optimally solving the stowage allocation problems are determined the sequence of
unloading inbound containers and loading outbound containers. The slot into which
each of the outbound containers will be stacked must be determined simultaneously.
When an indirect transfer system is used, yard cranes move containers between
yard stacks and yard trucks. The loading sequence of individual containers thus
impacts significantly the total distance traveled by yard cranes and hence the total
handling cost in the yard. This is not the case when a direct transfer system is used
since the yard handling cost is determined by the cost of yard truck movements
only, which is independent of the container loading sequence. In the stowage
(load/unload) sequencing problem, it is usually assumed that the stowage plan is
already constructed and provided by the vessel carrier.
New challenges for terminal operations are represented by arrival of mega ships.
Mega-ships increase pressure on terminals with lower frequency services and greater
throughput peaks for ports and terminals to deal with ([68]). Carrier alliances have
caused an increase in container re-handles due to the extraordinary randomness
of container discharges ([67]). Additionally, mega-ships require significant port
and terminal infrastructure modification that can be financially challenging to meet.
Below are described the main consequences:
Firstly, the draft limitation: most hub ports do not have enough draft which mega
container can berth easily without any draft limitation. One more, larger container
ships normally call at fewer ports. The physical features of such ships and handling
requirements add pressure to berth and crane operations.
Secondly, to quickly service the larger-sized ships, terminal operators use cranes over
longer working hours and more shifts, so the lack of crane ability can be another
reason escalating the lack of port facilities. Additionally, larger port calls may require
ships to spend more time at berth, which in turn reduces crane availability. More time
is also required to lash and unlash container berths ([88]).
Thirdly, the limited berth size is other demerit for mega ship, are also less flexible in
port area, they have limited choice to come along side berth with their side, so it may
result in longer time stay in port and also will negatively affect economies of scale.
Larger ship calls are often associated with lower service frequency and periods of
peak volumes at port terminals. Peak volumes handled by larger vessels lead to over
utilization of port capacity on some days and underutilization on others ([80]). As a
result, a reduction in berth utilization measured in TEU per metre of berth has been
observed.
Fourthly, greater cargo volumes per calls, create surges and pressures on yard
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operations, given the ensuing peaks.
As more equipment is required to move containers to and from stacking areas,
additional equipment and labour are necessary. Pressure is also imposed on the
restacking of containers through increased requirements for gantry cranes of yards
and stacking density. For specialized cargo such as refrigerated goods, larger port
call volumes exert pressure on the usage of reefer slots.
Another challenge, less developed hinterland facilities are one of drawbacks for mega
container ships in port. Hinterland is the area of land behind or around coast, it
has various types of facilities related to operate container including container yard,
warehouse, and road for land transportation. Therefore, hinterland influences to the
container operation directly.
Sharp increases in cargo volume also create greater demands on gate access, with
more trucks arriving and leaving with larger numbers of containers. This creates more
local congestion as more trucks are waiting to enter the port. Overall, large container
ships provide economies of scale at sea, but these economies do not necessarily
extend to ports. One study finds that a 1 % growth in ship size and its auxiliary
industry operations increases time in port by nearly 2.9 % and creates diseconomies
of scale at ports, indicating that economies of scale that are gained at sea are lost at
ports ([89]). The challenge with larger ships is how to avoid lost time at berths, as
ships take up more space and remain in port longer ([81]).
Finally, especially for smaller ports in developing regions, is how to decide on
the design of terminals, type of cargo-handling equipment to invest in, extent of
automation and digitalization of equipment, type of technology to adopt, and port
and staffing-level management ([92]). While there will be winners and losers in this
new operating landscape, the extent of the associated gains and losses are yet to be
fully understood.
As stated during the International Transportation Forum of 2016 [75], cooperation
between terminal operators is not unusual. Since the proliferation of the landlord
model of port governance in which the port authority keeps certain regulatory
functions but delegates port operations to private operators various countries have
adopted legislation that only allows global port operators in joint ventures with local
operators, in many case with a majority stake of the local operator. What is fairly new
is the cooperation between the largest global terminal operators. For some global
terminal operators these joint ventures start to make up a substantial part of their
terminal portfolio. For the moment, most of these joint ventures are concentrated in
certain geographical areas, in particular China, West Africa and North Europe, but
the number of joint ventures of global terminal operators is expected to grow . Some
terminal operators have also stakes in other operators, most notably PSA that has a
20% stake in HPH. Although certain pairs of terminal operators are more common
than others it might be too early to conclude that alliances of global terminal operators
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are emerging.
This might at some point become a concern for competition authorities and
legislators. The effects of terminal cooperation and consolidation will differ from
place to place, and general guidelines are not all together straight forward. A
reasonable amount of competition between port terminals is clearly in the public
interest, also because competition between ports is in many places limited because
of their natural gateway functions that cannot easily be replaced by other ports. At
the same time, the reality of mega ships would sometimes suggest the consolidation
of certain terminals, e.g. in order to create the required berth lengths or yard
space. Sometimes, port laws are restrictive in the terminal extensions they allow;
e.g. in Mexico the Port Law stipulates that port terminals can extend their area
up to 20%; if they would like to exceed such limit, they would need to bid for a
new terminal [75]. The alternative is relocation of part of the port, which could
be disadvantageous to incumbent port terminal operators, considering that they are
frequently excluded from bidding for reasons of competition. In some countries with
terminal fragmentation, port laws would need to be evaluated in order to assess if
the legislation is “mega-ship-ready”, that is: providing enough flexibility to terminal
operators and port authorities to renegotiate concessions within the light of changing
realities filled by mega-ships.
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2.1.3 Inland Transport
As container transport volume continues to grow, the links with the hinterland will
become a critical factor for the seaports competitive advantage, therefore progress
only in maritime part of the transport chain and in seaport terminals, without
improvements in seaport inland access, is not sufficient for the entire transportation
chain to effectively operate.
For continental movements, road freight transport continues to be the dominant mode
of transport. A look at recent European statistics confirms this. The upward trend in
the use of road transport has continued for many years, and it seems unlikely that the
importance of road freight transport will diminish in the near future. Rail freight has
remained relatively static for some time, but has increased slightly in recent years.
The diffusion of road freight transport as first means of goods’ transport is evident in
Fig. 2.10, where the modal split is compared for freight movements within individual
countries. Rail freight transport is prevalent in USA, Switzerland, Hungary and
Australia, where there are significant environmental issues and restrictions.
Figure 2.10: Freight transport modal share by country (percentage of tonn kilo metres)
The access to the hinterland is a key success factor for the ports, which aim to enhance
the quality of hinterland transport services [22]. To reach an adequate accessibility,
as stated by [12], coordination and cooperation between a large group of actors is
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required. Ports and their hinterland transport systems can attract more volumes if the
whole hinterland transport network is effective and efficient.
Italian infrastructures are already very close to their maximum capacity and with
the arrival of big vessels the situation will get worse. This yields the necessity
of increasing the effectiveness of the road transport for which one of the main
issues towards rationalization and optimization is the minimization of unproductive
trips. This can be beneficial, apart from an economic standpoint, also from an
environmental point of view in terms of congestion and air pollution reduction.
A way to optimize road transport could be by organizing and planning road services
in order to avoid empty way back also through collaboration between stakeholders
realizing efficient collaboration.
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2.2 World Economy: economical value of
containerized transport
World containerized trade continues to be largely determined by developments in
the world economy and trade, as well the generic merchandise trade. According to
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) studies published
in 2017, although the relationship between economic output and merchandise trade
seems to be shifting, with an observed decline in the growth ratio of trade to
gross domestic product (GDP) over recent years, demand for maritime transport
services remains heavily dependent on the performance of the world economy. While
industrial activity, economic output, merchandise trade and seaborne trade shipments
may be growing at different speeds, these variables remain, nevertheless, positively
correlated, as shown in Fig.2.11.
Figure 2.11: Gross domestic product, merchandise trade and seaborne shipments, 1975-2016
Looking closely to the last years (Fig. 2.12), in 2016 the GDP growth of both
Developed and Developing economies, decelerated due to weak global investment
environment, limited growth in world merchandise trade, increased trade policy
uncertainty and the continued negative impact of low commodity price levels both on
investment and the export earnings of commodity-exporting countries. In 2017, the
world economy and merchandise trade is expected to improve somewhat. However,
uncertainty and other factors, both positive and negative, continue to shape this
outlook. In this context, UNCTAD estimates that seaborne trade will increase by
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2.8 %, with total volumes reaching 10.6 billion tons. Its projections for the medium-
term point to continued expansion, with volumes growing at an estimated compound
annual growth rate of 3.2 % between 2017 and 2022. Volumes are set to expand
across all segments, with containerized trade and major dry bulk commodities trade
recording the fastest growth.
The comparison between GDP and containerized transport could be also focused to
Europe Union at 28 countries. Figure 2.13 represent the trends of this duality from
2006 to 2016.
Figure 2.12: Annual percentage change of World economic growth, 2015-2017
The total TEU handled in European ports (EU28) suffered from the economic and
financial crisis which started in late 2008. The year 2009 brought a TEU drop of
14% in the EU port system with some ports recording even much higher losses (e.g.
Hamburg saw a TEU volume drop of 28%), whit a slight decrease of the GDP. Since
2012, growth figures in container handling show a modest growth between 2.5% and
5% per annum followed by a significant increase of the GDP.
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Figure 2.13: Evolution of the GDP compared to the container throughput in EU 28
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2.2.1 World merchandise trend: actual and future value
As previously anticipated, the container throughput is one of the main driver of
the global economy and in this section is provided a detailed analysis of the world
performance. In 2016 Total volumes reached 10.3 billion tons, reflecting the addition
of over 260 million tons of cargo, about half of which was attributed to tanker trade,
as showed in Fig. 2.14.
Figure 2.14: International seaborne trade, selected years (Millions of tons loaded), 1980-2016
Looking at the containerized trade, in figures 2.15 and 2.16 it can be seen an
expansion at a faster rate of 3.1 % in 2016, with volumes attaining an estimated
140 million 20-foot equivalent units (TEU) ([95]). This recovery could be justified
with the accelerated growth in intra Asian cargo flows and positive trends in the trans
Pacific, with boules exceeding 25 million TEU. Volumes on the trans Atlantic trade
route increased by 2.9 %, reaching 7 million TEU in 2016.
As regards the future trends (see Fig. 2.17), UNCTAD forecasts an increase in world
seaborne trade volumes between 2017-2022 across all segments, with containerized
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Figure 2.15: Global containerized trade, 1996-2017 (Million 20-foot equivalent units and annual
percentage change)
trade and major dry bulk commodities recording the fastest growth. Containerized
trade is projected to grow by 4.5 %, owing mainly to growing intra-Asian trade
volumes and improved flows on the East-West main lanes. The projections see
an annual compound growth rate of 3.2 %, in line with some existing projections,
including by Clarksons Research and is consistent with the historical average annual
growth rate of 3 % estimated by UNCTAD in 1970-2016. This volumes increase
is likely to be supported by infrastructure development projects such as the One
Belt, One Road initiative (China), the International North-South Transport Corridor
(India, the Russian Federation and Central Asia) and the Quality for Infrastructure
Partnership (Japan).
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Figure 2.16: Containerized trade on major East-West trade routes, 2014-2017 (Million 20-foot
equivalent units and annual percentage change)
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Figure 2.17: Seaborne trade developments, 2017-2030
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2.2.2 World Port Container traffics: actual values and future
trends
Economical trends of ports are strictly related to the deployment of ever larger
ships, cascading of vessels from main trade lanes to secondary routes, growing
concentration in liner shipping, heightened consolidation activity, a reshuffling of
liner shipping alliances and growing cyber security threats.
World Container Terminals’s throughout is continuously increasing, 76 % of total
volumes handled in 2016 were accounted for by full containers, and 24 %, by empty
containers ([87]). Trans-shipment incidence was estimated at 26 %, although a
marginal drop in absolute TEU figures handled was observed in 2016.
Figure 2.18: Container port volume growth, 2016-2018
The 65% of World Volumes are performed by international operators, in Fig.2.19 are
showed the 10 leading companies.
Looking to the volumes handled in Europe the total container throughput increased
by 13.9% between pre-crisis year 2007 and 2016. But growth patterns differ per port
region.
The top 15 ports (2.20)are performing much better than in 2016 (+2.1%) and 2015
(-1.6%). The top three recorded a growth of 4.3% in H1 2017 compared to 2% in
2016 and -1% in 2015.
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Figure 2.19: Container port volume growth, 2016-2018
Figure 2.20: Containerized trade on major East-West trade routes, 2014-2017 (Million 20-foot
equivalent units and annual percentage change)
Sines in Portugal continues to strengthen its position in the European container port
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system with an impressive 34% growth in H1 2017. Barcelona, after the crisis of
2009, in 2017 seems to bring a trend break in the Catalonian port with an impressive
28.6% volume rise in H1. Also Genoa presents impressive growth figures, while
Greek hub port Piraeus shows more moderate growth after a very steep volume rise
in the past few years.
Europe’s largest container port Rotterdam outperformed rivals with an impressive
9.3% TEU growth in H1 2017. Also Le Havre can look back at a strong first half year.
Antwerp, a strong performer in 2015 and 2016 (i.e. +7.5% and +4% respectively),
recorded a more modest 1.9% increase in the first half of this year. Hamburg’s
container throughput stagnated, while neighbouring Bremerhaven handled 4.9% less
TEU in H1 2017.
The large differences in growth figures among individual ports are not only caused by
differences in the economic situation of the hinterland regions served. The dynamics
in the routing decisions of the large shipping alliances (2M, THE Alliance and Ocean
Alliance) are having their full impact on the (larger) container ports, while port
loyalty in the sea-sea transshipment market remains a loose concept ([96]).
Projected trade and freight flows to 2050 highlight the need to assess the capacity
of existing national infrastructure such as port terminals, airports or road and rail
infrastructure to deal with the bottlenecks that may emerge. The ITF study [77]
shows, in figures 2.21 and 2.22, that the container traffic related to international trade
could growth, under the high scenario, by 73% by 2030. This translates into over 1
billion TEU by 2030 and to nearly 2.2 billion TEU by 2050. Looking at the traffic by
2030, in relative terms, the largest capacity increases would be needed in South Asia
(193%), Southeast (163%), North Africa (138%) and West Africa (137%).
There are already numerous plans for port expansion. The Global Container Terminal
Operators from Drewry [56] forecast port capacity developments until 2025-30 based
on announced expansions in the coming decade. Based on the estimated capacity
developments up to 2030 it seems that there is sufficient capacity planned in most
regions to accommodate future traffic growth. Several regions appear to have severely
over planned capacity increases. Only in South Asia are projections for future freight
are higher than the estimated capacity expansion for the region.
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Figure 2.21: Traffic vs Capacity Growth by 2030
Figure 2.22: Container traffic by sea area in 2030 and 2050 and planned capacity 2030
45
2.2.3 Italian Port Container traffics: actual values and future
trends
Looking closely to Italian reality, Italian ports are keynotes of the TEN-Tnetwork and
inside the country two main sides can be distinguished:
- The north ports, located along the Adriatic Side, where the port of Trieste, is an
important traffic links with Croatian ports as well as with Greece and Turkey.
Along the Tyrrhenian side, the port of Genoa is the most important multi-traffic
and transit node for international sea trade.
- The mediterranean ports, situated along the asset Suez- Gibraltar channel,million
TEU provide the handling of containers from Far East to Europe, performing
mostly transshipment activities. Port of Naples, along the Tyrrhenian side, is an
important traffic and transit node form Mediterranean sea trade with the North
Africa. The port of Gioia Tauro is a transshipment hub, located in the barycenter
of the Mediterranean region, that attract transoceanic traffic and manage feeder
services for the distribution in the medium short range.
Italian ports are governed by the Italian Port System Authorities and are organized
into 15 Port System Authorities based in strategic decision-making centers based
in the Italian ”core” ports as set out by the EU. These are Genova, La Spezia,
Livorno, Civitavecchia, Cagliari, Napoli, Palermo, Augusta, Gioia Tauro, Taranto,
Bari, Ancona, Ravenna, Venezia and Trieste. The new Port System Authorities will
be in charge of 54 national ports. They are:
- Western Ligurian Sea: Genoa, Savona, and Vado Ligure (Savona);
- Eastern Ligurian Sea: La Spezia and Marina di Carrara (Massa e Carrara);
- Northern Tyrrhenian Sea: Leghorn, Piombino, Portoferraio, and Rio Marina (all
3 in Leghorn’s province);
- North-Central Tyrrhenian Sea: Civitavecchia and Fiumicino (both in Rome’s
province), and Gaeta (Latina);
- Central Tyrrhenian Sea: Naples, Salerno, and Castellammare di Stabia (Naples);
The Strait (of Messina): Gioia Tauro (Reggio Calabria), Crotone (old and new
ports), Corigliano Calabro (Cosenza), Taureana di Palmi and Villa San Giovanni
(both in Reggio Calabria’s province), Vibo Valentia, Reggio Calabria, Messina,
Milazzo and Tremestieri (both in Messina’s province);
- Sardinian Sea: Cagliari, Olbia, Porto Torres (Sassari), Golfo Aranci (Olbia-
Tempio), Oristano, Portoscuso-Portovesme (Carbonia-Iglesias), and Santa
Teresa di Gallura (only the commercial quay, in Olbia-Tempio’s province);
- Western Sicilian Sea: Palermo, Termini Imerese (Palermo), Porto Empedocle
(Agrigento), and Trapani;
- East Sicilian Sea: Augusta and Catania;
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- Southern Adriatic Sea: Bari, Brindisi, Manfredonia (Foggia), Barletta, and
Monopoli (Bari);
- Ionian Sea: Taranto;
- Central Adriatic Sea: Ancona, Falconara Marittima, Pescara, Pesaro, San
Benedetto del Tronto (Ascoli Piceno, except the tourist quay), and Ortona
(Chieti);
- North-Central Adriatic Sea: Ravenna;
- Northern Adriatic Sea: Venice and Chioggia (Venice); and, finally,
- Eastern Adriatic Sea: Trieste.
In Fig.2.23 volumes handled in the main Italian ports from 2006 to 2016 are reported.
Figure 2.23: Italian Ports volumes handled (TEU) from 2006 to 2016
Comparing the performance of Italian Gateways and Hubs throughput, over the past
years, it appears that the former achieved better throughput figures.
Italian hubs recorded a 3% average yearly decrease when looking at 2007 to 2016.
Put in absolute numbers, this means that Italian transshipment hubs handled a volume
of 3.5 million TEU in 2016, whilst the pre-crisis throughput figure of 2007 amounted
to 4.8 million TEU. This development corresponds to a decline of 26.5% when
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comparing the figures of 2016 with those of 2007. In the Mediterranean, the main
transshipment ports recorded a 3% increase in 2016.
Whilst hubs in Italy are dealing with declining throughput volumes, Italian gateways
achieved an increase in cargo volumes of 19.1% 2016 versus 2007, in spite of the
challenging market conditions. Almost 7 million TEU entered or left the country
via one of the national gateways in the last year, compared to 5.9 % in 2007.
However, when looking at 2016 in particular, the volume increase came in at only
1.2%. Looking at the new Italian ports governance reform, which reduced the port
authorities from 26 to 15 port system authorities, we can observe some specific trends
by analysing the figures of the last ten years.
Figure 2.24: Italian Ports volumes trends (TEU) from 2006 to 2016
Looking at Fig.2.24 must be noted that, Gioia Tauro is the first port in terms of
volumes handled, but being a transshipment hub, its throughput must be counted
by half, making Genoa the principal gateway ports.
The Port of Genoa covers an area of about 700 hectares of land and 500 hectares on
water, stretching for over 22 kilometres along the coastline, with 47 km of maritime
ways and 30 km of operative quays. There are 4 main entrances:
the Eastern inlet, affording access to the old port, to the shipyards, and to the
terminals of Sampierdarena
the Western (Cornigliano) inlet, used mostly by ships operating at the ILVA quays
the Multedo entrance, for ships operating in the oil terminals and to the Fincantieri
shipyards
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the Pra’ entrance, at the western end of the port, for ships operating at the container
terminal
In 2017, Genoa achieved a new record, handling 2,6 million of TEU with a growth
of 13% compared to 2016.
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Chapter 3
Optimal planning schemes for
combining multiple truck trips in a
seaport containerized environment
3.1 Problem description
3.1.1 The subject: truck carrier operators
In Italy the number of trucking companies is over 150 millions, 62 millions of which
transport goods over long distances, while in the rest of Europe those numbers are
significantly lower. In France 18 millions of road carrier companies are registered , 2
millions in Holland and only 900 in Germany. Reading these numbers, it could seem
that the highest volumes of road freight flows are transported in Italy, but this is not
a true fact. France, Germany and Holland share the 60-70% of the total amount of
European traffics. More in detail, in Italy two typologies of road services could be
distinguished: the so called “own account” and “third account” services. Belongs to
the first typology the transport executed by physical or juridical persons, private or
public, of every nature, that operate transportation operations to their own needs (art.
31 L. 298/74) and for which transport doesn’t represent the main economic activity
but only a complementary activity. Complementary activities are realized if:
• Goods transported must be directly linked to the main activity of the company
(i.e. fruit trader that transport fruits);
• Vehicles must be in line with the needs of the company (i.e. a small artisan
cannot have 6 articulated cars);
• Costs of transport do not have to heavily affect over the total costs of the
company;
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• The transport must be made with a proper vehicle and driven personally by the
owner or by one of his employees;
If one of these conditions is not respected the activity of transport could not be
considered in “own account” but in “third account”(v. art. 88 CDS).
Otherwise, “third account” means the provision of a service performed in a
professional and non-instrumental way to other activities, consisting in the transfer
of goods by road by means of motor vehicles, after payment of a consideration. This
activity is regulated by European Community with the regalement n. 1071/2009 and
by law n. 35 del 04/04/2012 and successive disposition. Some peculiar characteristics
are:
• Goods transported belong to a third subject, that is not the one that makes the
transport;
• to have the license of transport who makes the transport must be enrolled in the
official albo of trucking companies.
Traffic composition present the dominance of the ”third account” over the ”own
account”.
The provision of services on behalf of third parties in the field of motor transport is
subject to a mandatory tariff regime and the stipulation of contracts outside the legal
limits is forbidden. The mandatory tariffs are different according to the type of goods
delivered, the distance to be traveled and by weight classes, they are updated year by
year by a decree of the Ministry of Transport. They are the sum of the actual transport,
the time of the vehicle stop and the operations for the loading and unloading of the
goods.
In the model phase we have based the set of the parameters on these tariffs.
Another element of distinction is the quantities of goods transported: “collet
transport” and “full transport”. The first category is composed of little amount of
goods from different senders to different recipients. They are organized in function
of:
• Collection of packages at the buyer’s businesses;
• Charge, storage and discharge of goods;
• Transfer of goods by line trucks from main house to peripheral branches;
The full service is instead the transfer of an huge amount of homogeneous goods
from one sender to one recipient. Usually the charge correspond to the maximum
capacity of the vehicle.
In this Thesis the focus is on containerized transport and the main issue is the
organization of the transport in order to maximize the vehicle capacity and routes.
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3.1.2 Road Hinterland Connection Inefficiencies
Road haulage had the largest share of the modal split from the very start. It had
three comparative advantages: it was flexible, as it could be hauled anywhere; it
was fast, as truck transport did not need to be transshipped before reaching the final
destination; and it was cheap over short distances. Speed did, however, become
less important as the emphasis on regularity and reliability grew. Additionally, the
introduction of the maritime container caused a shift of power from the trucker to
the sea shipping company, with the former losing its old steady contacts, to the latter
and the sea shipping company started to dictate the conditions. Moreover, instead
of the customary prices per hour, the journey with a maritime container was paid by
piece without the guarantee that the same company could transport more containers
from the same ship. Furthermore, the task of the truck drivers was simplified as
they no longer had to load or unload the trucks, which needed a lot of experience.
The driver’s only task, therefore, was to drive the truck between two points without
even touching the contents of the container. This was a process that attracted new
competition, whether from: the sea shipping companies, which could arrange their
own transport; foreign truckers; and other modalities. While a train could transport a
maximum of 80 TEU, a truck could carry two TEU, equating to one 40 foot or two 20
foot containers, but nowadays deep sea container ship has been able to easily carry as
many as 18,000 TEU; at least 25 trains and approximately 3000 trucks were needed
to transport to the hinterland the volumes of just one ocean going vessel. This cause
the two majour issues of the truck transport: infrastructure congestion and pollution.
Existing national infrastructure already faces issues of insufficient capacity in some
regions of the world, especially in port cities. Projected trade flows to 2050 and
the growing freight volumes highlight the need to assess the capacity of existing
national infrastructure, making the rationalization of road transport an urgent need to
be satisfied.
Nevertheless, the inefficiency of the vehicle utilization, explained in Section 1.1,
makes the truck transport a sector with very low profits.
These considerations brought to the research question to find out a proper
optimization model able to reduce planning inefficiencies, such as empty
repositioning trips, in order to reduce costs and increase performance. To achieve this
goal, is important the agreement of a multitude of truck carrier operators, because a
large scale optimization can bring benefits not only to individual carrier operators
but also the the entire community, reducing congestion and, as major positive
consequence, pollutant emissions. This statement brings to the second research
objective: consider the possibility to extend the optimization model proposed to a
collaboration set of truck carrier operators, formulating a proper mechanism of profit
share.
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3.1.3 The considered network
A main feature of the considered network is the presence of maritime terminals
(ports) and inland nodes (corresponding to companies, logistic platforms or dry ports)
connected to ports by road connections. A transportation demand composed of a
certain number of containers to be transferred between pairs of nodes has to be
satisfied. This demand specifically refers to the demand mainly generated by a set of
ports; in other words, we are here considering all the trips that include the import and
export flows of containers in the inland basin of a set of ports. Moreover, some other
container movements to be executed between inland terminals are also considered for
the sake of completeness.
In order to further characterize the considered transportation activities, let us indicate
with trip the movement realized by one vehicle between a pair of nodes. During a
trip, the vehicle can be loaded with a full container (realizing what is called a full
trip) or it can be loaded with an empty container (empty trip). Moreover, a trip can
be further classified as:
- an import trip, corresponding to the case in which a full container has to be
picked-up at a port and transferred to an inland node;
- an export trip, when a full container must be transported from an inland node to
a port;
- an inland trip, with which a full container is transported from an inland node to
another one.
In order to understand the problem properly, it is important to highlight the economic
difference between loaded and empty flows. Loaded movements take place in
response to customer requests, who bear transportation costs. Empty movements
generate only costs and represent an unavoidable phase for the continuity of their
activity. These empty flows occur for various reasons and, due to sakes of simplicity,
major attention is devoted to the container based distribution of goods on behalf
of customers. Typically a shipper, to meet the purposes of his/her industrial and
commercial activities, requests shipping company to provide containers of a given
type to his/her location on a specific day. Then one or more trucks pick up suitable
containers from a location close to the shipper and move such an equipment to
him/her. Once containers are loaded, they are put on trucks and moved to the
destination. Afterward containers are loaded on appropriate vessels and moved
through a series of intermediate ports to the destination port. Here they are unloaded
and moved to the receiver using trucks or a combination of rail trains and trucks,
according to the standard paradigm of door-to door service. Once the final destination
has been reached, containers are unloaded and moved back either to a suitable depot,
where they are stored while awaiting future requests, or immediately dispatched to
a new shipper. Every profitable movement of a loaded container generates a non-
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profitable empty movement, which is however essential for the continuing operations
of shipping companies. Those trips are usually called ”round trip” mode. This means
that the truck has to perform both the productive trip and also the way back to its
origin. This second part of the trip is ordinarily performed without a payload, so
producing an unproductive empty trip. Round trips are very common mainly due to
the competition between truck carriers/freight forwarders and shipping companies in
the inland transport sector. In fact, even if in the “merchant haulage” mode - which
is the case considered in this Thesis - truck carriers/freight forwarders are in charge
of the inland transport organization, the decision of where to bring back the empty
container is imposed by shipping companies that are the usual owners of containers.
With the goal of dominating the inland transport sector, shipping companies usually
oblige to bring back empty containers to the points where trips started, which may
reduce profit margins for truck carriers.
Figure 3.1: Sketch of the problem.
Figure 3.1 provides a sketch of the considered network type, composed of three ports
and fourteen inland nodes. Import, export and inland trips demand are highlighted
with different types of lines. Note that import and export trips may refer to different
ports and that, in this particular “seaport-hinterland” context, import and export
trips are usually longer than inland trips, which are typically executed to reposition
containers or to satisfy a local demand. The idea is to combine, when possible, ”round
trips” avoiding empty ways back and reducing unproductive trips. The way it could
be done will be better explained in 3.1.3.
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The possibility of combining trips in such a way that they can be realized by the same
vehicle in a sequence (route) is exploited in this section. To highlight the benefit of
combining trips Fig. 3.2 shows - as an example - the difference between the case in
which four trips are performed singularly (left-side) and the case in which they are
performed in combination in the same route by using the same truck and the same
load unit (right-side). In the left-side case, four empty trips are necessary to satisfy
the whole demand, while in the right-side case the number of empty trips is reduced
being it necessary to move the truck with an empty container only when destinations
and origins of consecutive trips do not coincide (the trips devoted to transferring the
truck with an empty container to the next node of the same route are also called
repositioning trips). The necessity of repositioning containers is typically imposed
by shipping companies. Note that, when the origin of the first trip and the destination
of the last trip in a combination do not coincide but they refer to two different ports in
which the shipping line has an empty depot, the repositioning activity can be avoided.
Figure 3.2: Four trips performed singularly (left side) versus four trips performed in combination
(right side)
The combination of trips can be performed in two different ways: by using the same
container or by adopting different containers. However, this only implies a different
amount of time needed to perform the necessary activities in the logistic nodes. More
clearly, if the same container is used, operations of stuffing and stripping of goods
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have to be executed in the node whereas, if different load units are adopted, activities
of loading and unloading the containers on and from trucks have to be performed.
In this work the first case is considered but, by only changing the value of the time
delay needed in the nodes for performing the specific operations, also the second case
would be easily tackled.
As highlighted in Fig. 3.2, the combination of trips presents possible benefits.
Nonetheless, in order to consider a certain trip combination, several operative aspects
that may affect its feasibility or its effectiveness must be taken into account. In this
work the following factors are explicitly considered:
- node time windows, related to both opening and closing times of terminals and
companies. They have to be strictly respected (hard time constraints);
- trip due-dates which are usually imposed by (or agreed with) customers. They
represent soft time constraints;
- cargo features to be taken into account when the same container is used for two
subsequent trips. In fact, when using the same load unit for consecutive trips,
the compatibility between the different goods which are the subjects of the trips
must be checked and satisfied. Assuming that two trips are combined, the kind
of goods transported in the first trip cannot be, as instance, dirtier than the goods
that have to be transported during the second trip (e.g. the sequence t-shirts and
animal feed is admitted, but not viceversa);
- European (EU) driving rules, which have to be strictly respected by truck drivers.
This affects the total operative time available and, also, the number of truck
drivers needed.
It is to be noted that trip due-dates can be violated, but in case this happens, delay
costs must be considered. These cost terms assume a different meaning when
referring to import, inland or export trips. In the first two cases delay costs refer
to eventual fines to be paid to companies or inland nodes for not respecting imposed
(or agreed) due-dates for picking-up or delivering containers. In case of export trips,
delay costs are related to “change of vessel” fees to be paid to seaport terminal
operators for replanning containers on the next ships.
With reference to the cargo compatibility to be fulfilled when the same container is
used, this typically refers to the “cleanness” of goods. This means that trips can be
matched according to a criticality index associated with the transported goods. A
criticality index with a value equal to “1” corresponds to a high level of dirtiness
or toxicity of goods, determining that the container cannot be reused for another
trip (unless a specific treatment is made, which is not here considered). A value
equal to “2” indicates the presence of goods which make the container reusable
only in some specific cases; finally, a value equal to “3” means that the container
can be reused without any treatment. For instance, the combination of four trips
with criticality indexes 3-2-2-2 is allowed because the level of dirt increases from
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3 (meaning “clean”) to 2 (“dirty”) and then it does not change. The case 3-2-2-3,
instead, is not permitted because the third and forth trip are not compatible.
When considering a combination of four trips, the allowable sequences of criticality
indexes are listed in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Allowable sequences of the criticality index
Two Three Four
Comb. Comb. Comb.
3-3 3-3-3 3-3-3-3
3-2 3-3-2 3-3-3-2
2-2 3-2-2 3-3-2-2
2-1 3-2-1 3-2-2-2
1-1 3-1-1 3-2-2-1
- 2-2-2 3-2-1-1
- 2-2-1 3-1-1-1
- 2-1-1 2-2-2-2
- 1-1-1 2-2-2-1
- - 2-2-1-1
- - 2-1-1-1
- - 1-1-1-1
Finally, regarding European driving rules, according to the European Regulation
3820/85, specific constraints regarding working times, breaks and rest periods for
drivers have to be respected when planning truck routes. Since the planning approach
proposed is daily based, only daily restrictions are taken into account. These rules
define the maximum legal daily and weekly driving hours, and the management of
breaks, as follows:
- during a working day, after 4.5 consecutive hours of driving, the driver has to
take a break not smaller than 45 minutes. During this rest period the driver is not
allowed to drive nor to undertake any other working activity;
- during a working day, the maximum driving period is equal to 9 hours, after
which a driver shall take a daily rest of at least 11 hours, during which he may
freely dispose of his time.
The presence of the above mentioned driving rules has to be explicitly considered
because they affect the number of drivers needed to perform a certain sequence of
trips and, then, a certain combination. As a matter of fact, when the time needed to
perform a trip combination requires the activity of several drivers, a cost is obviously
incurred. Table 3.2 shows the number of drivers needed on average over an horizon
of one day to fulfil the EU driving hour constraints.
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Table 3.2: Number of drivers needed according to number of trips in a combination.
] of trips ] of
combined drivers
2 1
3 1
4 1
5 2
6 2
7 3
By looking at Table 3.2, it can be observed that, considering one working day and a
single driver, it is difficult to combine more than four trips in a single route because
the trips due-dates and the other time constraints would be probably violated, thus
causing high delay costs that would neutralize the convenience of combining trips.
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3.2 Literature Review on Multiple Trip Combination
As also pointed out in [72], in the last few years a growing attention has been
placed on problems related to multiple trip optimization and routing. This is due
to the numerous application contexts (such as maritime transportation, city logistics
distribution, road inland transportation or inventory routing) of such problems.
Table 3.3: Literature on MTVRP problems: main features, considered extensions and adopted
solution methods
Author Year VRP Multiple Depot TW Service dep. Limited trip EU driv. Trip due Cargo Solution
trips load. times duration hours to dates features method
[70] 2016 x x x Exact
[9] 2002 x x x x x Heuristics
[2] 1990 x x Heuristics (sav. algorithm)
[3] 1996 x x x Heuristics (tabu search)
[5] 1998 x x x x Heuristic (tabu search)
[6] 1999 x x x x x x Heuristic (different search approach)
[7] 2000 x x x x Four heuristic algorithms
[8] 2002 x x x x x x Heuristic (genetic algorithms)
[11] 2004 x x x Heuristic (genetic algorithms)
[14] 2006 x x x x x Heuristic (Large Neighbourhood Search (LNS))
[15] 2006 x x x x Mixed integer program+consolidation algorithm
[16] 2006 x x x Heuristic (Large Neighbourhood Search (LNS))
[18] 2007 x x x x Exact
[19] 2007 x x x x Heuristic (tabu search)
[20] 2007 x Heuristic
[21] 2007 x x x x Heuristic (genetic algorithms)
[23] 2008 x x x x Heuristic (tabu search)
[24] 2008 x x x Dynamic algorithm
[25] 2008 x x x x Exact (column generation)
[28] 2009 x x x x x x Heuristic (an adaptive guidance mechanism)
[29] 2010 x x x x x x x Exact
[32] 2011 x x x x x x Exact (pseudo polynomial model)
[34] 2011 x x x x Exact (branch and cut algorithm)
[35] 2011 x x x x x Insertion construction heuristic
[33] 2011 x x x x x x Heuristic ( metaheuristic)
[37] 2013 x x x x x Adaptive Large Neighbourhood Search (ALNS) metaheuristic
[38] 2013 x x x x Exact (branch and price algorithm)
[46] 2013 x x x x x Exact (branch and price algorithm)
[42] 2013 x x x x Memetic algortihm
[47] 2014 x x x x x x x Exact
[48] 2014 x x x x x x Heuristic (genetic algorithms)
[52] 2014 x x x x x x Heuristic (adaptive memory procedure paradigm)
[53] 2014 x x x x x x Heuristic (Adaptive Large Neighbourhood Search (ALNS))
[54] 2014 x x x x x x x Heuristic (two constructive heuristic by local search)
[72] 2016 x x x x x Heuristic (Adaptive heuristic dominance)
[83] 2017 x x x x Exact
[84] 2017 x x x Exact
Table 3.3 ([70], [9], [2], [3], [5], [6], [7], [8], [11], [14], [15], [16], [18], [19], [20],
[21], [23], [24], [25] ,[28], [29], [32], [34], [35], [33], [37], [38], [46], [42], [47],
[48], [52], [53], [54], [73], [83], [84]) provides a non comprehensive overview of the
papers available in the literature regarding the Multi-Trip Vehicle Routing problems
(MTVRPs). Most of the papers are also included in the recent survey [72], where
mathematical formulations as well as exact and heuristic approaches are provided,
together with the main variants for this problem and its areas of application.
Table 3.3 presents several approaches for the MTVRP and, for each approach, the
table highlights the main features related to some specific requirements. More
specifically, the aspects considered in Table 3.3 regard the presence of:
- Time Windows (TW column) related to opening and closing times of network
points (as instance terminals and companies);
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- Service dependent loading times, i.e., the cases in which the loading time of a
vehicle at the first network point depends on the customers visited during the
trip;
- Limited trip durations, arising when each trip can have a maximum time
duration;
- European driving hour rules, that are rules governing the drivers’ behaviour;
- Trip due-dates;
- Cargo features constraints, related to the typology of goods than can be
transported in the different containers.
The last column of Table 3.3 reports which kind of solution approach for the
considered planning problem has been proposed in the corresponding paper.
It can be noticed that, in the last years, the presence of time windows is a feature of
an increasing number of the available papers whereas other features, such as service
dependent loading times and limited trip durations, are rarely addressed. A very
limited number of papers considers EU driving hour constraints, and even a smaller
number of works takes into account trip due-dates and cargo features. Regarding
the adopted solution method, most of the problems have been faced with heuristic
approaches, as also highlighted in [72].
Even though a clear increase in the number of contributions in multiple trips
optimization can be observed in the recent years, the literature on MTVRP is
still partial and further investigation is required to take into account new operative
requirements and bigger instances of the problem.
Other aspects considered in MTVRPs regard the capacity of vehicles (see for instance
[9]), the presence of heterogeneous fleets or the evaluation of CO2 emissions as done
in [59]. Moreover, [45] and [117] address the multiple combinations of trips and
empty containers on the same truck considering the transportation of up to two 20-
feet or one 40-feet container on a truck.
As regards the solution methods proposed, [2] had, as first, treated the multiple trips
combination problem, through a saving based method and a bin packing heuristic. In
[3] Eric et al. allocated vehicles with a bin packing heuristic after having constructed
a set of possible routes generated by a Tabu Search method. [4] and [13] applied
an adaptive memory heuristic with a minmax and a minimization cost objective,
respectively. More specifically, in order to reduce unnecessary traffic flow, most
works in the field attempt to combine pick-up and delivery trips together to reduce
empty movements of containers [43]. These studies are then extended to the cases
that further merging the route with inland deliveries [51], and/or considering the
usage of dual-carriage trucks [62]. No matter what specific context is considered,
almost all previous studies base their discussions around the general Mixed Integer
Programming (MIP) model for the Vehicle Routing Problem with Simultaneous
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Pickups and Deliveries and Time Windows (VRPSPDTW), which is originally
designed in generic vehicle routing literature [44].
As underlined by [83], those models produce optimal solutions that tells which link
should be travelled by which truck, but are limited to the cases where a number of
individual trips are combinable to form a single delivery/pick-up route and not always
valide for container delivery since the latter normally just allows the combination
of no more than two (import only) or four (import and export) trips in one return
route due to the capacity of vehicle (dual-carriage). On the other hand, as in the
VRP-SPDTW model, one has to start from transforming the demand graph into one
with a distinct node for every single task, the number of nodes and links are largely
increased which improves the difficulty of solving the problem, and therefore makes
the solution only available via heuristics.
Other recent works, inspired by real life cases, combined multiple trip routes with
time windows and vehicle capacity constraints, such as the one presented in [30]
where a heuristic approach for determining pick up and delivery sequences for
daily operations with the goal of minimizing transportation costs is proposed. Azi
et al. ([18]) developed an exact column generation approach for a single vehicle
considering time windows and then extended this work to the multiple vehicle case
[29]. Vidovic et al. ([36]) solved the problem when pick up and delivery nodes may
be visited only during predefined time intervals. Authors solved the problem of trip
combination as a multiple assignment model, with a commercial software thanks to
the small dimension of the variables indexes, that is four in case of dual-carriage or
two if the truck can carry only one container at voyage.
Recently the problem was studied in [40], where a Tabu Search meta heuristic for the
time dependent and multi-zone multi-trip vehicle routing problem with time windows
is presented. Other meta-heuristics are proposed by [41] where the total operating
time of all trucks is minimized respecting hard time constraints, and by [42] where
the trips combination problem is solved with a local search procedure. Time windows
have also considered in [63] where two branch-and price frameworks based on two
set covering formulations are proposed. [64] solved the same problem by applying a
Tabu Search algorithm. In all the works above cited, EU driving time regulations are
not taken into account.
In [33] Derigs et al. presented two heuristic approaches for road feeder services
devoted to air cargo in which driving hours constraints are strictly considered to
combine multiple trips with the same tractor. In [71] a solution of a multiple trips
door-to-door service for picking and delivering customers to the airport (MTM-
D2PDCA) is proposed and solved by using a three-phase exact algorithm.
In [50], an optimization approach devoted to combine trips two by two in a
cooperative environment among different carriers is proposed, whereas [45] and [49]
address the multiple combinations of trips and empty containers on the same truck
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considering the transportation of up to two 20-foot or one 40-foot container on a
truck.
Driving hours and traffic congestion are considered in [34], where an integer linear
problem that minimizes the total duty time is formulated. In [31] the problem
of scheduling working hours of team drivers in European road freight transport is
studied. The problem of visiting a sequence of locations within given time windows
is solved by applying a depth-first-breadth-second search method which can find a
feasible schedule complying with standard daily driving time limits. In [83] the work
of [36] is extended considering more realistic restrictions such as the working hours
restrictions for drivers, the ready time of containers at and/or the expected departure
from ports and the possibility of having some containers with multiple customer
locations as its receivers. The model formulated is a MILP and has been tested over
some numerical examples without any heuristics.
Summarizing, although the combination of trips is very useful, the number of
scientific approaches dealing with this critical issue is not very high and, as previously
pointed out, most of them solve this problem by using heuristic techniques.
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3.3 Thesis main contribution in multiple trip
combination
The contribution of this Thesis in the multiple trip combination problem follows:
- compared with the classical VRP formulations presented in 3.2, where couple of
trips are considered, a more compact and clear formulation is proposed, since all
the possible trips belonging to a combination are considered;
- the context analyzed is the one related to seaports and their connection with the
hinterland. This context is characterized by the presence of import and export
trips (typically being long-distance trips mainly related to the need of fulfilling a
demand of full containers) and inland trips (typically having a shorter distance to
be covered and mainly dedicated to repositioning trips). This is a specific feature
of the considered case study giving rise to some features of the planning problem
that will be described in the next section;
- a different objective function is provided in comparison with the classical
MTVRP formulation. This latter minimizes the total traveling cost covered by
vehicles, whereas in this work the cost saving obtained when performing trips in
combination instead of singularly is minimized;
- time windows and service times in nodes are considered such as in some variants
of the MTVRP (see, for instance, [32], [47], [52], [53], [73]);
- important operative aspects such as goods compatibility, trip due-dates and
driving hour rules, which are often neglected by the papers in the literature, are
here considered;
- truck depots are not considered. It must be noted that the majority of papers
regarding MTVRP takes into account depots. The specificity of the network here
addressed (as it will be explained in the following section) makes it possible to
neglect the presence of depots;
- trucks capacities are not considered since each trip is referred to a container to
be moved between an origin and a destination, and not to boxes or other freight
type to be filled in a truck. This aspect is also considered in the Rollon - Rolloff
Vehicle Routing Problem (RRVRP) [7]. Both in our problem and in the RRVRP
only one cargo unit (container or trailer) is considered at a time, all trucks (or
tractors) are identical, the length of each truck (or trailer) workday is fixed, each
truck (or trailer) route involves multiple trips, and service time is considered.
However, the work [7] does not take into account node time windows, cargo
features and EU driving times.
All the above mentioned differences motivate the decision of defining an ad-hoc
modeling approach for the problem under investigation, instead of adopting existing
models that would not adequately fit the problem characteristics. This approach has
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been formulated and published in [60] and in [61], in which trips were combined in
fixed combinations of three trips each with the goal of maximizing the carrier cost
saving, and in [69] , [86] where trips, belonging to different carriers are shared with
the goal of maximizing carrier profits, as will be further explained in Chapter 4.
Moreover, the present Thesis formulates and compares different optimization
schemes for combining multiple trips with the goal of determining the most efficient
trip combination in order to maximize the total cost saving of a road carrier. More
specifically, the following alternatives for combining trips are defined and compared:
- fixed size scheme. In this approach trips are combined in pre-fixed size
combinations, i.e. in combinations composed only of 4 (four by four), 3 (three
by three) or 2 (two by two) trips respectively;
- sequential scheme. In this scheme three optimization models are solved in
sequence: initially, a first problem combines trips four by four, then the second
matches the remaining trips in three by three combinations and, finally, the third
problem combines the residual trips two by two;
- variable size scheme. In this scheme a single optimization model combining at
the same time all the trips in different-sized combinations is applied.
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3.4 Optimization Schemes for multiple trip
combination
The optimization approach aimed at finding the best combinations of road trips in a
containerized transportation network as the one presented in Section 3.1.3 is detailed
in the present section. Three optimization schemes are proposed, named fixed size
scheme, sequential scheme and variable size scheme.
The first optimization scheme studied during the three years of PhD has been the
fixed-size scheme. By this scheme trips combinations composed of a fixed number
of trips are taken into account. This means that trips are combined two by two,
three by three or four by four as reported in Fig. 3.3 for the three by three case
(the two by two and four by four cases are analogous). In the following, fixed
size combinations will be denoted as fixed-2 scheme in the case in which trips are
combined two by two, fixed-3 scheme, and fixed-4 scheme when three by three and
four by four combinations are adopted, respectively.
It should be noted that in most cases real operators do not face the problem of
combining trips, especially when they operate in small-medium sized enterprises.
The most efficient real situation that is encountered refers to some carriers grouping
trips two by two (which means a fixed size scheme) when planning their activities. At
the best of our knowledge, the three by three and four by four cases are almost never
adopted in real cases but they have been considered in this thesis in order to introduce
new combinations and to evaluate the corresponding performance.
After, followed the optimization scheme sequential scheme, where, instead, three
phases are sequentially executed. First, all combinations of 4 trips are determined,
then, the remaining set of trips is considered in order to find the best 3 by 3
combinations. Finally, the remaining trips are combined 2 by 2. The three phases
are shown in Fig.3.4.
In the sequential scheme, instead, trips are combined in three phases in a sequential
way. First, all combinations of 4 trips are determined, then, the remaining set of
trips is considered in order to find the best three by three combinations. Finally, the
remaining trips are possibly combined two by two. These three phases are shown in
Fig.3.4.
Finally, in the variable size scheme the best combinations with variable size (i.e.,
different number of trips in each combination) are computed all at once over the
whole set of trips, as depicted in Fig. 3.5. Again, it can be noted that the sequential
scheme and the variable size scheme have not yet been adopted by real operators.
They are defined and analyzed in this thesis in order to evaluate their performance.
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Figure 3.3: Optimization scheme of the fixed size approach for three by three combinations
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Figure 3.4: Optimization scheme of the sequential approach
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Figure 3.5: Optimization scheme of the variable size approach
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3.4.1 The mathematical model
The model used in all the optimization schemes to determine the best combinations
of trips in the considered road network is stated in the following. The transportation
network is represented as a graph G = (V,A), where V is the set of nodes and A the
set of links. Nodes are the points of origin and destination of trips (corresponding to
companies, ports, dry ports or logistic platforms), whereas a link is the shortest path
that connects two nodes.
The following notation is adopted:
- T is the set of trips;
- cu is the unitary transportation cost (expressed in euro/km);
- di, i ∈ T , is the travelled distance related to trip i;
- ti, i ∈ T , is the travel time necessary for executing trip i. It depends on the
distance di and the average speed v of a generic truck: ti = div ;
- hi, i ∈ T , is the due-date of trip i, which is always assumed to be respected if
trip i is realized as a single trip;
- ri, i ∈ T , is the release time of trip i, that is the time in which the trip is available
to be executed;
- qi, i ∈ T , is the starting time of trip i; it is assumed to coincide with the release
time of the trip if the trip is executed singularly and for the first trip of any
combination;
- fi, i ∈ T , is the finishing time of trip i. It coincides with its due-date hi if trip i
is realized as a single trip;
- il, i, l ∈ T , is the distance between the destination of trip i and the origin of
trip l. This is the distance to be covered by a vehicle if trips i and l are executed
consecutively, in which case the vehicle has to cover such a distance loaded with
an empty container (i.e., with an empty trip). Of course, il = 0 if the destination
of trip i coincides with the origin of trip l;
- Ci, i ∈ T , is the cost for realizing trip i singularly. It is given by equation (3.1):
Ci = 2cudi, i ∈ T (3.1)
The following notation is further introduced to consider time windows and driving
hours constraints:
- a is a parameter that takes into account the maximum number of daily driving
hours allowed by European regulation, i.e. 9 hours;
- s is the service time needed in each node for stuffing/unstuffing goods in a
container (or loading/ unloading container when using different containers in
a route);
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- λ is the duration of a break when the limit of 4.5 hours of consecutive driving is
reached. λ is set equal to 45 minutes.
- Oi, Oˆi, i ∈ T , are respectively the opening and closing time of the starting node
of trip i;
- Di, Dˆi, i ∈ T , are respectively the opening and closing time of the destination
node of trip i;
- cd is the unitary cost of delay (expressed in euro/h).
The set C is the set of all possible trip combinations. Set C depends on the considered
optimization scheme. In the fixed-2 scheme in which trips are combined two by two,
C = C2 ∈
(
T×T), whereas it is C = C3 ∈ (T×T×T) and C = C4 ∈ (T×T×T×T)
in the three by three and four by four fixed size schemes, respectively. Moreover, in
the sequential scheme, set C is varied in the three steps of the procedure as it will be
descrived later on. Finally, the set C = Cv ∈
(
T×T×T×T)∪(T×T×T)∪(T×T)
is adopted for the variable size scheme. It is important to note that each element of
set C, i.e, each combination of trips, also defines the order in which trips are executed.
The following further notation is necessary:
- l(c), c ∈ C is the number of elements in the generic combination c (obviously it
is l(c) = 2, ∀c ∈ C2, l(c) = 3, ∀c ∈ C3, l(c) = 4,∀c ∈ C4);
- L is the maximum number of trips in a combination, that in our case is 4;
- w(i, c), i ∈ T, c ∈ C, is a function that takes on value equal to 1 if trip i is
included in combination c, 0 otherwise;
- vi(c), c ∈ C, i ∈ T , is a function that identifies the index of the i-th trip in trip
combination c; note that the function returns a value equal to 0 if the i-th trip
does not belong to the considered combination;
- τtot(c), c ∈ C, is the total time for executing combination c;
- bc, c ∈ C, is the number of breaks allowed for combination c. It is introduced
in order to take into account EU driving hours restriction (i.e. a break must be
performed after 4.5 hours of driving);
- gc, c ∈ C, is a binary parameter that assumes value equal to 1 if it is possible
to combine the trips belonging to combination c in function of their goods
characteristics (i.e. their level of cleanness);
- Cc, c ∈ C, is the cost for serving combination c. Note that such cost includes
transportation costs and possible delay costs to be taken into account when
realizing the considered trip combination.
As regards the timing of trips, it has already been specified that the starting time of
a trip which is executed singularly coincides with the release time of the trip and
the same happens for the first trip of any combination. Then, the starting times of
single trips and the starting times of the trip combinations are actually a-priori given.
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Moreover, the finishing times of single trips are assumed to be coincident with the
trips due-dates and also these times are not matter of decision. Still it is necessary
to define the starting times of all the trips belonging to a combination, apart from the
first one, and the finishing times of all trips included in a combination.
The following expressions provide the computation of finishing times:
fvi(c) = qvi(c) + tvi(c) + bcλ c ∈ C, i = 1, . . . , l(c) (3.2)
Once determined the finishing time of the last trip in a given combination, the overall
time necessary for executing the combination can be computed as follows
τtot(c) = fvl(c)(c) + vlc (c),v1(c) c ∈ C (3.3)
The above time also includes a possible repositioning trip to be executed after the
last trip in a combination to bring the empty container back to the origin of the first
trip of the combination. It must be noted that, as already described in Section 3.1.3,
whenever the first trip of a combination starts in a port and the last trip of the same
combination is again a port, it can happen that no repositioning is necessary if the
shipping line has an empty depot in both ports, so allowing to leave the container
indifferently in one of the two.
Starting times must, instead, be defined in such a way that possible repositioning
trips are considered and the correct sequencing of trips inside the combination is
guaranteed. This is done by fulfilling the following relations
qvi+1(c) = tvi(c) + vi(c),vi+1(c) c ∈ C, i = 1, . . . , l(c)− 1 (3.4)
Figure 3.6 provides a sketch of the proposed time window framework in which, in
the upper diagram, the timing of four not combined trips is reported whereas, in
the lower diagram, the same timing is depicted when trips are combined. It can be
noticed that, when trips are not combined (upper diagram), hard time windows related
to opening and closing times of nodes are respected, as well as trip deadlines which
are assumed to coincide with trip finishing times (in other words, trips are performed
so that their finishing times exactly correspond to their deadlines). However, when
trips are combined (lower diagram), apart from the first trip (whose finishing time
is always supposed to fulfil the deadline), it may happen that some constraints are
violated. If a hard time constraint, such as the opening time of the origin node of trip
l, is not respected, the combination cannot be performed; on the contrary, if a soft
time window constraint is violated, such as the deadline of trip l, a delay cost has to
be paid. In other words, coupling trips can delay some trips (apart the first one) with
the consequence that the related deadlines hk are no more respected.
The decision variables of the problem are:
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Figure 3.6: The time window framework in case of 4 trips.
- yc, c ∈ C, binary variables assuming value equal to 1 if trip combination c is
chosen;
- xi, i ∈ T , binary variables assuming value equal to 1 if trip i is performed
singularly.
As already mentioned, the considered cost function refers to the cost saving that
carriers obtain by executing trip combinations instead of single trips. The cost saving
is determined as the difference between the cost for executing all trips singularly and
the cost associated with the best combination of single trips and trips combinations.
In order to compute the cost saving it is necessary to determine the cost for realizing
a generic trip combination c, c ∈ C; such cost is given by
Cc =
( l(c)∑
i=1
cudvi(c)
)
+
( l(c)−1∑
i=1
vi(c),vi+1(c) + vlc (c),v1(c)
)
+
( l(c)∑
i=1
cdmax{fvi(c) − hvi(c), 0}
) c ∈ C (3.5)
Three terms compose the above expression of cost Cc: the first term is the
transportation cost necessary for executing all the trips in the combination. The
second part of the cost refers to the cost of possible repositioning trips to be executed
between consecutive trips and the last term of (3.5) takes into account delay costs.
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The third term in Cc induces a nonlinearity which is tackled in the problem statement
by considering two sets of linear constraints in place of (3.5).
The problem formulation follows.
Problem 1. Find the optimal values of yc, c ∈ C and xi, maximizing the cost function∑
i∈T
Ci(1− xi)−
∑
c∈C
Ccyc (3.6)
subject to (3.2), (3.3) and
Cc ≥
( l(c)∑
i=1
cudvi(c)
)
+
( l(c)−1∑
i=1
vi(c),vi+1(c) + vlc (c),v1(c)
)
+
( l(c)∑
i=1
cd
(
fvi(c) − hvi(c)
)) c ∈ C (3.7)
Cc ≥
( l(c)∑
i=1
cudvi(c)
)
+
( l(c)−1∑
i=1
vi(c),vi+1(c) + vlc (c),v1(c)
) c ∈ C (3.8)
xi +
∑
c∈C:w(i,c)=1
yc = 1 i ∈ T (3.9)
0 ≤ (qvi(c) −Ovi(c))yc ≤ Oˆvi(c)yc c ∈ C, i = 2, . . . , l(c) (3.10)
0 ≤ (fvi(c) −Dvi(c))yc ≤ Dˆvi(c)yc c ∈ C, i = 1, . . . , l(c) (3.11)
yc ≤ gc c ∈ C (3.12)
bcyc ≤ 1 c ∈ C (3.13)
τtot(c)yc ≤ a c ∈ C (3.14)
yc ∈ (0, 1) c ∈ C (3.15)
xi ∈ (0, 1) i ∈ T (3.16)
fvi(c) ≥ 0 c ∈ C, i = 1, . . . , l(c) (3.17)
qvi(c) ≥ 0 c ∈ C, i = 2, . . . , l(c) (3.18)
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The resulting problem is a MILP (Mixed Integer Linear Programming) problem
in which the objective function (3.6) is the sum of the cost savings obtained
by performing trips in all the combination types allowed, instead of singularly.
Constraints (3.7) and (3.8) are used to define the expression of the cost Cc as in
(3.5). Constraints (5.5) ensure that each trip is performed, either singularly or in
a combination. Constraints (3.10) and (3.11) refer to the presence of opening and
closing time windows of nodes.
Constraints (3.12) guarantee that only combinations in which the criticality indices
of trips are compatible are chosen, while constraints (3.13) ensure that no more than
one break is executed during a route in order not to overcome the maximum daily
driving hours. Moreover, constraints (5.6) check that the time required by a truck
for performing a combination does not exceed the total time availability of the truck.
Finally, constraints (3.15)÷(3.18) define the nature of the decision variables included
in the problem.
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3.5 Experimental results
An experimental campaign based on real data has been carried out to validate the
efficacy of the proposed optimization schemes.
The models have been implemented in Visual Studio 2012 C ] by using Cplex 12.3
as MILP solver. The data have been collected during several interviews with trucking
companies and logistic service operators and refer to an area of about 300 kilometers
and a time horizon of one day. The data used to test the proposed schemes regard
a real demand of trips related to the seaport basin of the Ligurian ports of Genoa,
Savona and La Spezia, and their hinterlands around the cities of Milan and Turin.
The information collected are the following: the typology of trips (import, export or
inland), origin and destination nodes as well as node time windows, trip due-dates,
type of goods transported, operative costs. Delay costs have been estimated on the
basis of the fees imposed by terminal operators and by quantifying the annoyance due
to the possibility of loosing a ship departure or not respecting the original schedule.
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 provide the data related to the trips considered in the experimental
campaign; in particular, Table 3.4 presents the data related to inland trips, while Table
3.5 refers to import and export trips.
The last columns of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the values related to the goods
compatibility index. As explained in Section 3.1.3, this index reflects the degree of
“dirtiness” of the goods filled in the containers: numbers 1, 2 and 3 mean respectively
“very dirty”, “dirty” and “clean”. So, trips can be combined in the same route only
if this index decreases in a combination or remains the same (e.g., 2-1-1, 3-2-1 or
3-2-1-1 are admittable combinations).
The unitary delay cost is assumed to be 15 euro/h, while the repositioning distance
is a real data provided by the interviewed operators.
Seven sets of trips (i.e. 7; 9; 11; 14; 17; 25; 30) and four scenarios S1÷S4 (Table 3.6)
have been considered, which differ for the type of trip, the opening and closing times
of nodes and the trip due-date. The following classification has been used:
- (T − A): the majority of trips are of inland type;
- (T −B): the majority of trips are of import/export type;
- (W − A): opening and closing time windows of nodes are less restricted;
- (W −B): opening and closing time windows of nodes are more limiting;
- (D − A): trip due-dates are less restricted;
- (D −B): trip due-dates are more bounded.
More specifically in scenarios S1 and S2, trip due-dates and node time windows are
set large enough to minimize delay costs and to allow the maximum number of trip
combinations in a route, whereas in scenarios S3 and S4, trip due-dates and node time
windows are both set to be as strict as possible.
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Table 3.4: Data related to inland trips
Trip ] Typology Distance Time window Due-date Comp.
(km) (hour) (hour) index
T-A T-A W-A D-A
1 imp 160 7 - 12 /15 - 18 15 3
2 inl 41 7 - 13 /15 - 18 18 3
3 exp 178 8 - 13/15 - 18 18 3
4 imp 133 7 - 12/16 - 20 17 2
5 inl 50 8 - 13/15 - 18 15 1
6 inl 64 8 - 13/14 - 18 14 2
7 inl 80 8 - 12/15 - 20 15 1
8 inl 28 8 - 13/15 - 18 18 2
9 inl 70 8 - 13/14 - 18 18 1
10 inl 75 8 - 13/15 - 18 16 2
11 exp 116 8 - 13/15 - 19 18 2
12 inl 74 8 - 13/15 - 18 18 3
13 inl 49 9 - 13/14 - 19 18 2
14 inl 52 8 - 13/15 - 18 20 1
15 inl 38 8 - 13/15 - 18 18 2
16 inl 60 8 - 13/15 - 18 18 2
17 imp 140 8 - 12/15 - 20 18 3
18 inl 37 8 - 12/ 15 - 20 18 1
19 inl 110 8 -13/ 15 - 18 18 2
20 exp 90 7 - 12/16 - 20 18 2
21 imp 40 7 - 12/16 - 20 18 1
22 inl 90 8 - 13/15 - 18 16 2
23 exp 80 9 - 13/14 - 19 20 3
24 exp 167 7 - 12/16 - 20 20 3
25 inl 126 9 - 13/14 - 19 15 2
26 inl 62 8 - 12/15 - 20 18 2
27 exp 144 9 - 13/14 - 19 18 3
28 imp 137 8 - 13/14 - 18 18 1
29 inl 110 8 - 13/15 - 18 16 2
30 exp 120 7 - 12/16 - 20 20 3
The effect of time windows and due-dates is basically different: time windows, being
hard constraints, limit the number of trips that can be combined in a route, while
due-dates usually affect the cost saving by decreasing it when delay costs occur.
The maximum number of trips has been determined on the basis of the real data
available. It is worth underlining that, considering a daily basis and the activity of a
single carrier, 30 is a realistic number of trips in a medium-sized port area such as the
one of the Italian ports of Genoa, Savona and La Spezia.
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Table 3.5: Data related to import and export trips
Trip ] Typology Distance Time window Due-date Comp.
(km) (hour) (hour) index
T-B T-B W-B D-B
1 inl 60 8 - 9/16 - 17 13 2
2 inl 50 8 - 9/16 - 17 17 2
3 imp 115 8 - 9/16 - 17 16 1
4 imp 124 8 - 9/16 - 17 16 3
5 exp 167 8 - 9/16 - 17 20 3
6 exp 130 8 - 9/15 - 16 18 1
7 imp 116 8 - 9/16 - 17 13 3
8 imp 120 8 - 9/16 - 17 14 3
9 imp 130 8 - 9/15 - 16 15 2
10 inl 70 8 - 9/15 - 16 14 1
11 inl 45 8- 9/15 - 16 17 2
12 imp 115 8 - 9/15 - 16 16 3
13 inl 54 8 - 9/15 - 16 12 1
14 inl 54 8 - 10/15 - 16 16 2
15 imp 140 8 - 9/15 - 16 17 1
16 inl 60 8 - 9/15 - 16 14 2
17 inl 56 8 - 9/16 - 17 15 1
18 imp 116 8 - 9/16 - 17 16 3
19 imp 130 8 - 9/15 - 16 17 2
20 inl 58 8 - 9/16 - 17 15 3
21 inl 110 8 - 9/16 - 17 16 2
22 imp 150 8 - 9/15 - 16 12 2
23 inl 56 8 - 9/15 - 16 13 1
24 inl 48 8 - 9/16 - 17 18 2
25 imp 158 8 - 9/15 - 16 17 2
26 inl 60 8 - 9/16 - 17 14 2
27 inl 57 8 - 9/15 - 16 17 1
28 inl 56 8 - 9/15 - 16 15 2
29 imp 130 8 - 9/15 - 16 12 2
30 inl 58 8 - 9/16 - 17 18 2
Table 3.6: Considered scenarios
W-A W-B
D-A D-B
T-A S1 S3
T-B S2 S4
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3.5.1 Comparison of optimization schemes
In the following, a comparison between the proposed schemes is performed. Six
cases are considered:
- Case 1 - No trip combinations: all trips are performed singularly, without any
combination;
- Case 2 - Fixed-2: trips are combined in two by two (2-trips) combinations;
- Case 3 - Fixed-3: trips are combined in three by three (3-trips) combinations;
- Case 4 - Fixed-4: trips are combined in four by four (4-trips) combinations;
- Case 5 - Sequential: trips are combined in combinations of 4-3-2 trips
respectively, determined in a sequential way. In this case, the mathematical
model is applied three times, with the proper modifications, respectively for the
4-trips, 3-trips and 2-trips sized combinations;
- Case 6 - Variable size: in this case, the mathematical model is applied and
variable-sized trip combinations are provided as an outcome of the problem.
Table 3.7 shows the comparison between the situation in which trips are not combined
(Case 1) and the various combination methods for each considered scenario. The
comparison is performed in terms of the percentage of cost saving obtained with
the proposed schemes with respect to the total cost Ctot required for performing
all trips singularly. Note that Ctot in scenarios S1 and S3 is always lower than the
corresponding one for scenarios S2 and S4 since inland trips are on average shorter
than import/export ones, thus requiring smaller costs.
By observing the obtained results, there is a clear improvement of cost savings
in the case 6 - Variable size optimization method. This is due to the fact that this
scheme is more flexible in the choice of the most proper types of combinations, thus
maximizing the cost benefit. For instance, when applying case 6 - Variable size to a
demand of 9 trips and to scenario S1, the types of combinations generated may be
“two 4-trip combinations + one single trip” or “three 3-trip combinations”, with a
total of three routes in both cases, whereas Case 2 - Fixed-2 may generate “four 2-
trip combinations + one single trip”, i.e., five routes that require higher transportation
costs compared to the former case.
Moreover, when increasing the demand of trips to be combined, the difference
between the cost savings generated by the fixed size methods (especially Case 2)
and the ones produced by Case 5 and Case 6 is higher. This is due to the fact that,
when a larger number of trips is considered, Case 5 and Case 6 can take into account
a bigger number of combinations to find the most profitable ones.
By looking at the different scenarios it can be further observed that when node time
windows and trip due-dates are more restrictive as in scenarios S3 and S4, lower cost
savings are generated. This can be noted by zooming into a demand consisting of 17
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trips for which Fig. 3.7 shows the comparison between the cost saving percentage
obtained in case of scenarios S1 and S3 (left side of the figure) and the one referred
to scenarios S2 and S4 (right side of the figure). The cost savings obtained are always
bigger in case of Scenarios S1 and S2 compared with scenarios S3 and S4 due to the
impact of more penalizing trip due-dates and time windows in these last scenarios.
In fact, when applying scenarios S2 and S4, big size combinations (i.e. 4-trip and
and 3-trip ones), which are more profitable, are easily infeasible. Then, only small
combinations can be exploited and, consequently, the corresponding value of the
objective function decreases.
For scenario S1, the variable size, fixed-4 and sequential approaches obtain the same
types of trip combinations and, so, the same objective function value. Instead, for
scenarios S2 and S3, the combinations obtained are all different: in the variable size
scheme 3-trip and 2-trip combinations are allowed and, so, they are chosen in order
not to incur in the expensive execution of single trips.
Figure 3.7: Comparisons between scenarios S1 and S3, and scenarios S2 and S4 for a number of
trips equal to 17 - Cost savings %
Another important aspect is represented by the number of routes (i.e. number of
combinations of trips) needed to serve the whole transport demand. Figure 3.8 reports
the differences in terms of number of routes generated by the proposed optimization
schemes and for a different demand. The lowest number of routes is usually generated
by Case 5- Sequential and Case 6 - Variable size (this also yields a lower number of
trucks needed to execute the whole demand of trips).
When node time windows and trip due-dates are more restrictive, such as in scenarios
S3 and S4, a higher number of routes is needed compared with S1 and S2, respectively.
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Table 3.7: Comparative analysis among optimization schemes for S1− S3, and S2− S4
Trip Scen. Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
] No combin. Fixed-2 Fixed3 Fixed-4 Sequential Variable size
Ctot Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost
saving % saving % saving % saving % saving %
S1 1088 57 57 43 71 71
S3 1088 43 29 43 43 43
7 S2 1422 57 57 43 71 71
S4 1422 43 54 0 43 43
S1 1292 44 67 67 67 67
S3 1292 44 67 67 56 67
9 S2 1866 44 67 67 67 67
S4 1866 44 44 33 56 56
S1 1532 45 55 55 73 73
S3 1532 45 55 55 55 55
11 S2 2360 45 55 55 73 73
S4 2360 45 36 27 55 55
S1 2032 50 57 64 64 71
S3 2032 43 57 64 57 57
14 S2 3218 50 57 64 57 64
S4 3218 43 29 21 57 57
S1 2552 47 59 69 69 71
S3 2552 41 59 53 59 59
17 S2 4036 47 59 59 59 65
S4 4036 41 35 53 53 53
S1 3766 48 64 72 72 72
S3 3766 40 48 36 36 64
25 S2 5600 48 64 72 60 64
S4 5600 28 48 48 44 44
S1 4181 50 67 70 73 73
S3 4181 43 60 67 63 63
30 S2 6142 50 67 70 67 67
S4 6142 40 60 53 60 60
Obviously, when trips are performed singularly, the number of routes generated is
equal to the number of trips.
Again, considering a trip demand of 17 trips, the number of routes classified
according to their length (i.e. the number of trips in each route) and obtained as
optimal solution of each optimization scheme is shown in Fig. 3.9. It can be noticed
that the number of single trips is minimized in the variable size case.
Fig. 3.10 presents, instead, the difference of cost saving percentage between the best
optimization method, that is Case 6 - Variable size, and Case 1 - no combination and
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Figure 3.8: Comparison among the number of routes generated in each scheme. Scenarios S1,
S3, S2, S4
Figure 3.9: Number of routes (trip combinations) with different trip length performed in case of
17 trips for all scenarios and optimization methods
Case 2 - Fixed-2 for all the considered scenarios. Note that Case 1 and Case 2 are the
ones used by real small-medium sized companies to plan and optimize their trips. The
histogram shows that the variable size optimization case provides significant benefits
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Figure 3.10: Number of routes (trip combinations) with different trip length performed in case
of 17 trips with the variable case for Scenarios S1, S2 and S3
compared with these two benchmarks.
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3.5.2 Comparison with real planning
With the aim of furtherly highlighting the efficiency of the variable size optimization
method, the solution generated by this approach with the real planning provided by
a company located in Northern Italy have been compared . The comparison has
been made for both scenario S1 and S3 and it considers a real demand of 17 trips to
be fulfilled in the hinterland area of the ports of Genoa, Savona and La Spezia, in
Northern Italy.
In Tables 3.8(a), 3.8(b) and in Tables 3.9(a), 3.9(b), it is possible to compare the
combinations found for scenarios S1 and S3 by using the proposed optimization
scheme and the real planning, respectively.
Figs.3.11 and 3.12 highlight the planned routes. Red and grey arrows refer to empty
and single trips, respectively. It may be observed that in both cases the real planning
(right sides of Figs. 3.11 and 3.12) generates a significantly higher number of empty
trips with respect to the solutions obtained by the variable size optimization approach
(left sides of Figs. 3.11 and 3.12).
As pointed out in the previous paragraph, scenario S1 performs better than scenario
S3 since it is characterized by more convenient trip due-dates and node time windows.
It can also be observed that the route 3-6-10-17 (that is performed in both scenarios
when applying the variable size method) starts in the port of La Spezia and ends in
the port of Genoa, without a last repositioning trip. This is possible since, in that
case, the shipping company owns empty depots in both ports, allowing to leave the
empty container indifferently in one of the two.
Table 3.8: Trips combinations performed as an output of the Case 6 - Variable method (8a) and
a real planning (8b) for scenario S1.
(a) S1-Case 6
4 3 2 1
trips trips trips trip
4-7-13-15 11
1-5-9-14
3-6-10-17
2-8-12-16
(b) S1-Real plan.
4 3 2 1
trips trips trips trip
16-12 17
4-7
1-14
5-9
13-15
2-8
10-6
3-11
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Figure 3.11: Plot of the solutions obtained for scenario S1 and 17 trips: comparison between
Case 6 - Variable size and a real planning
Figure 3.12: Plot of the solutions obtained for scenario S3 and 17 trips: comparison between
Case 6 - Variable size and a real planning
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Table 3.9: Trips combinations performed as an output of the Case 6 - Variable method (8a) and
a real planning (8b) for scenario S3.
(a) S3-Case 6
4 3 2 1
trips trips trips trip
3-6-10-17 14-2-8 16-12 11
4-7-13 15
1-5-9
(b) S3-Real plan.
4 3 2 1
trips trips trips trip
16-12 17
4-7 15
6-10 3
5-9 14
2-8 1
11
13
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3.5.3 Computational Analysis
A computational analysis has been carried out in order to test the practical
applicability of the proposed approach. All the computations have been executed
using a laptop with the following features: Intel R core TM i5 CPU M430 2,27 GHz
with 4 GB of RAM.
The maximum number of trips that have been considered is 30. As already stated, this
number is acceptable considering the average trip demand of a single carrier serving
a standard port area on a daily basis.
Table 3.10 provides the results obtained for the different considered approaches. Of
course, the number of variables and constraints increases when raising up the number
of trips, but also for the biggest instances (i.e. 30 trips) the C-plex solver finds a
solution within few minutes of computational time.
The variable size approach is characterized by a shorter CPU time and a lower
number of variables and constraints compared with the sequential scheme, making
the former a preferable choice between the two methods. Moreover the computational
time required by the variable size approach is reasonable for a daily problem, making
it suitable for daily planning of carrier operators.
Table 3.10: Computational analysis
Trip Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
] Fixed-2 Fixed-3 Fixed-4 Sequential Variable
7 4.2 2.4 9.6 28 9.0
9 5.4 5.4 10.2 144 10.8
CPU 11 9.8 17.4 22.8 348 18.9
time (sec) 17 31.4 33.2 44.3 438 38.9
25 25.0 71.0 122 623 61.85
30 62 85.0 329 906 34.7
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Chapter 4
Horizontal cooperation among road
freight carriers
4.1 Problem Description
The current economic context is facing a growing competitive pressure, a deep
environmental concerns and implementation of new business models. Logistic
collaboration is emerging as a new opportunity for improving connections, increasing
the service level, gaining new market shares, enhancing capacities and reducing
negative impacts of the bullwhip effect. Nevertheless, the complexity of the decision
making process when more partners are involved, should be taken in consideration.
Potential partners are more tempted to participate in collaboration settings if aspects
of organization and management of coalitions are well defined, the stability of the
relationship is ensured and if they can obtain greater benefits than the ones obtained
individually.
Therefore, it becomes crucial to determine how to build and manage collaborations
efficiently, as well as how to share benefits equitably to ensure the long-term stability
of the collaboration. In particular, it is necessary to determine which entity or entities
should lead the relationship, what the specific objectives are to aim for, and which
information should be shared to support the collaboration. It is also essential to
identify the value of the collaboration as well as how benefits will be shared.
Due to the economic downturn and focus on cost reductions, the transport and
logistics industry is evolving from a necessary, though low priority function to an
important part of business that can enable companies to attain a competitive edge
over their competitors.
As described in [139], because profit margins are shrinking especially in the
transport-intensive commodity producing sectors, efficient logistics management can
in fact be the decisive factor for a company’s success, since competition will take
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place on the basis of costs, service and timeliness. Once more the increased operating
costs cannot be transferred to the customers, because the sector is fragmented and
cannot take a stand against the multinational and powerful customers. This situation
determines the vicious circle described in the european study CO3 ([139]), where the
low profit margins, strong fragmentation and price competition focused to the lowest
price and not to the improved quality, determine a stagnant situation where no time
and no monetary resources are spent to develop new skills or proactive initiatives are
undertaken to structurally improve the service levels. This induces even thinner profit
margins and stronger competition, starting another iteration of the vicious circle.
Figure 4.1: The Vicious Circle of Carrier Operators, (Cruijssen 2006)
Although not readily available from the Eurostat database, the European Union
(2010) in cooperation with Eurostat estimates the value of transport industry to 302
billion euro. However, this industry is heavily fragmented. The 10 biggest European
Logistic Service providers do not serve more than 15 % of the total market. A very
large share of the trucking companies in the European union even operate five trucks
or less, resulting in a highly fragmented industry structure, intense competition and
small profit margins. In our country there were trucks and pulling units by April
2017, operated by around 87.371 companies ([146]), which majority is composed by
small companies of maximum 5 vehicles and this causes transport inefficiency.
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4.1.1 Forms of collaboration
Collaboration can be realized into two directions: vertical and horizontal. In the
first case we refer to collaboration across different and heterogeneous levels of the
supply chain and the aim is to integrate all the actors in a common agreement.
In the case of horizontal collaboration we refer to collaboration among logistics
operator at the same level of the supply chain such as trucks operators or shippers.
Partners share networks and fleets and could resort to multiple trips combination
to service all the transport demand in order to optimize the general demand of
transport. In particular, horizontal cooperation is proven to be effective in terms
of costs reduction and improving logistics qualities but applications are still rare.
The major responsible of this gap is the lack of a proper collaboration model,
especially for what concerns costs/gains distribution. This is mostly because
participants, though often working towards a common objective, are guided by their
own self-interests. Therefore, any proposed mechanism to manage the collaboration’s
activities should yield collectively and individually desirable solutions. At the highest
level, developing a successful collaboration involves two primary tasks: identifying
and exploiting synergies between individuals, and allocating the resulting benefits
among the collaborators. Benefits depend on interactions between participants and
identifying and exploiting synergies often involves solving complex optimization
problems and thus may be quite challenging. Benefits could be dived in qualitative
and quantitative. We refer to qualitative benefits as social and prestige advantages
in consequence of the alliance with other partners, and are never sharable, while
quantitative benefits could be sharable or not sharable. When a quantitative benefit
is sharable has to be used a proper sharing method to redistribute benefits among
participants and it is a crucial moment of the alliance because it must ensure that
the benefits gained by each entity make the collaboration acceptable for every one
and more attractive than single operability. When a quantitative collaboration is not
sharable the distribution of profits could be based on the addition of constraints such
as trips deadline to ensure acceptable delivery reductions for each member.
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4.1.2 Why to collaborate: collaboration objectives
The objectives of the horizontal collaborations foresee the improvement of efficiency
and the reduction of unproductive trips and can be listed as the following:
1. Cost reduction: The most frequent objective of horizontal collaboration is cost
reduction. Most short-term collaboration initiatives from practice have cost
reduction as their primary goal.
2. Growth Through collaboration: especially logistics service providers can
establish financial growth (increased turnover or profit) or geographically extend
their coverage by combining the networks of all partners. Moreover, the bundled
forces make it possible to tender on large contracts that are normally only
reserved for the bigger players.
3. Innovation: Innovative service concepts, the introduction of new systems and
technology (e.g., RF tags) and inter-organizational learning can increase the
quality of the services offered by cooperating. The new concepts or technology
will in many cases be too labor- or capital intensive to be introduced by a single
company.
4. Information and quick response in an economy that is enabled by information
flows, obtaining the most accurate and real time information offers the key
to a worldwide competitive advantage. Technological progress in information
and communication technology supports cheap and efficient communication
between the partners in a network. Besides through best-in-class ICT
capabilities, response times can also be shortened by introducing innovative
cooperative logistics concepts or by benefiting from partners’ distribution or
storage networks. For example, courier companies may exchange orders to cut
lead times to levels that would be impossible to achieve individually.
5. Social relevance horizontal collaboration can be an effective way to achieve
a higher capacity utilization by exchanging loads and equipment between the
geographically dispersed partners. Load exchanges, central planning, shared
distribution centers etc. all increase the efficiency of road transport and are
a potential remedy for the increased transport demand. Through horizontal
collaboration, the increase in ton-kilometers can be kept under control, even
when modal shift is impossible.
In Fig.4.2 Cruijssen et al. (2007a) proposed a list of opportunities of horizontal
collaboration divided into three main groups: Costs and productivity, Customer
Service and Market position. They have been evaluated with the following options:
1) strongly disagree; 2) disagree; 3) neutral; 4) agree; 5) strongly agree.
To succeed in collaboration means being able to overcome the limitations of the
individual approach such as:
1. Shipments and deliveries fragmentation as first cause of inefficient logistics;
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Figure 4.2: Opportunities for horizontal collaboration (Cruijssen 2007)
2. Huge number of empty trips;
3. Conflicts between customers and operators. Collaboration and use of common
KPI could help transparency of activities and real time sharing information;
4. Modal and international barriers that may be lacking due to the collaboration
between all the logistics stakeholders.
Successful factors of collaboration are presented by:
1. Find ways where all participants can gain;
2. Choose partners for their ability to work together in the long term and not just in
the short term;
3. Implementation of cooperation in areas where there is a solid basis to build on
the strengths and not to compensate for weaknesses;
4. Manage performance measurement and impacts together to prevent
misalignment of goals.
In the present Thesis the issue of horizontal collaboration between road carriers is
tackled with the object of improving the coalition profit by using an optimization
based scheme that will be explained in Section 5.
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4.1.3 How to build logistic collaborations
The way to establish a collaboration framework depends on two main elements:
the information sharing and the business interaction, as well as the degree of
interaction between partners. For instance, companies that decide to set a simple
form of collaboration may exchange only transactional data such as orders, payments,
delivery confirmation etc. On the other hand, companies that decide to jointly plan
operations should agree on objectives, share strategic information such as customer
demand, forecasts and operational capacities and decide on key performance
indicators. Interaction between partners must be lead during the whole lifecycle of
the collaboration, that Simatupang et al. in [110] describe as four step process:
1. engagement: in this phase the aims are the identification of the strategic needs,
of right partners and the set of mutual agreements concerning performance;
2. planning: in this phase are planned resources, tasks and capabilities for future
requirements;
3. implementation: members of the coalition perform daily operations to effectively
meet the short and long term goals;
4. evaluation process: is set to evaluate and decide whether if the coalition needs
any change.
Motivation is another key element of the collaboration success that authors of [110]
defined with these three strategyes:
1. Reward observable actions that lead to a common goal,rather than reward the
attainment of the goal itself;
2. Using performance metrics to evaluate the achievements of individual partners
on important objectives of the cooperation;
3. Joint goals are set and the gains that are created are allocated to the partners
based on an ex-ante agreed gain-sharing mechanism.
In fig. 4.3 Palmer et al. ([113]) describe how the collaborative framework for the
horizontal collaboration should be. This framework has been successively evolved
into a business model that includes also the infrastructure used to support the
collaboration, the relationship between partners and the financial elements covering
costs, services and gain sharing mechanism.
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Figure 4.3: Collaborative framework (Palmer 2003)
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4.1.4 Choice of the partners
The element that characterize all the collaboration alliances is the choice of
suitable partners. Collaboration is based on trust, information sharing, decision
synchronization and incentive alignments. According to the literature, [82] listed
the main issues that influence partners trust.
1. Commitment: the ongoing relationship is worth working on to ensure that
it endures indefinitely. Commitment is considered the least factor that can
influence partners behavior and trust ([105]).
2. Capability: is searched during the partners selection, is defined as as competence
or work standard, skill, knowledge, and ability required to fulfill a promise,
agreement, or obligation ([131]).
3. Information sharing: is as the act of capturing and disseminating timely and
relevant information for decision makers to plan and control supply chain
operations ([115]). Information sharing must be timeless and of relevant and
accurate information.
4. Communication: is the contact and message transmission process in terms of
frequency, direction, mode and influence strategy ([135]).
5. Asset specificity: are transaction-specific investments involving physical or
human assets that are dedicated to a particular relationship and cannot be
redeployed easily ([106])
6. Resource sharing: the process of leveraging capabilities and assets and investing
in capabilities and assets with supply chain partners. Essentially, these concepts
drive entities to collaborate, when underlying resources are difficult to redeploy
([135]).
7. Joint knowledge creation: the extent to which supply chain partners develop a
better understanding of and response to the market and competitive environment
by working together ([135]).
8. Incentive alignment: the process of sharing costs, risks, and benefits among
supply chain partners. Saving allocation: partners share benefits of collaboration
fairly ([135], [116], [141], [120], [136], [142], [110], [129]).
9. Bargaining power: The ability of a person, group, or organization to exert
influence over another party in order to influence the outcome of the negotiation
and to achieve a favorable deal ([116]).
10. Opportunism: A particular form of inconsistency of purpose, involving
disclosure of incomplete/misleading information, especially calculated efforts
to mislead, distort, disguise, confuse, or cause confusion and usage of alliance
resources: Fair or unfair usage of alliance resources to create a value outside of
the alliance ([132]).
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4.1.5 Managing collaboration
The most difficult aspect of the collaboration is its management. With the only term
management is taken into account:
• the definition of leadership
• the mechanism of the benefits and costs sharing;
• the determination of who is responsible of what;
• the definition of what can be shared and which information are needed.
The leadership of the alliance depends on serious of factors such as the dimension
of the alliance as well as their contribution and organization philosophy. [128] have
identified six different forms of leadership currently used in transportation.
1. A supplier/customer/producer leads the collaboration: it aims to minimize its
transport costs by finding other customers/producers that can provide a good
equilibrium (geographical, volume and time) between supply and demand.
2. A carrier/3PL leads the collaboration: it aims to maximize its profit by a better
usage of its carrying capacity.
3. A coalition of suppliers/customers/producers shares the leadership of the
collaboration: they aim to minimize their transportation costs.
4. A coalition of carriers/3PLs shares the leadership of the collaboration: they aim
to maximize their profit by a better usage of their joint carrying capacity.
5. A coalition of carrier(s)/3PL(s) and supplier(s)/customer(s)/producers(s) shares
the leadership of the collaboration: they aim to minimize their transportation
costs by using the carrying capacity of the carriers.
6. A 4PL leads the collaboration: it aims to minimize/maximize the cost/profit of
its partner.
In the present Thesis the leadership of the alliance is decentralized and shared
between the members of the coalition with the aim of reducing transportation costs
and increasing individual profit by an optimized distribution of routes and unbalanced
trips.
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4.1.6 Methods for sharing benefits
In a successful collaboration scheme, the gain sharing mechanism must be effectively
designed. It must be fair and understandable by every member of the coalition. In the
literature, it can be observed that most of the collaboration rules distribute savings
proportionally to a single indicator of either size or contribution to synergy ([139]), a
non exhaustive example list could be:
- proportional to the number of customers served
- proportional to the logistic costs before the collaboration
- proportional to the distance travelled for each trip
- proportional to the number of trips
- equal splits
These rules are simple and transparent but if the gain share is only proportional to the
number of trips executed without taking into consideration the distance travelled, the
carrier who serves an huge quantitate of short distance trips obtains more synergy
than one that perform a lower number of long distance trips. Proportional rules
may also allocate to a subgroup of participants more costs than the subgroup’s
individual costs, ([127]), determining the necessity to accurately quantify the
marginal contributions of each member of the coalition to the total gain. This issue is
addressed by some cooperative game theory rules.
Game theory is considered as a decision aiding tool for collaboration issues. The
”game” is intend as a description of the possible strategic interaction that participants
(players) can undertake by submitting some certain constraints and interest. Games
are distinguished in ”cooperative” and ”non - cooperative”.
The Cooperative game takes place when commitments (agreements, promises etc)
are fully binding and enforceable. It is applied when potential collaborators can
achieve more benefit by collaborating than staying alone. The focus is centered
on cooperative behavior by analyzing and simulating the negotiation process within
a group of players in establishing a contract of the collaboratively generated
revenues allocation or collaboratively avoided costs. In particular, the possible levels
of collaboration and the revenues of each possible coalition (a subgroup of the
players’consortium) are taken into account so as to allow for a better comparison
of each player’s role and impact within the group as a whole. In this way, players
in a coalition can settle on a compromise allocation in an objectively justifiable way,
moderated by a trustee.
Some of the most well known game theoretical gain sharing mechanism are here
introduced and will be exploited in section 5.4. Cooperative Game Theory addresses
both the Gain Sharing and coalition formation. With ”gain” is defined the utility
generated in collaboration, and ”coalition” represents the group of players that could
be the potential collaborators. The coalition formation focuses on which coalitions
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should form to maximize the total utility generated by collaboration under stability
constraint, while the gain sharing emphasize the fairness of utility allocation, which
provoke incentive to stable long term collaboration. The ”utility” concept is the
focus of both gain sharing mechanisms and coalition formation problems, and could
be defined as the amount of benefits achieved thanks to the collaboration. It could
betransferable or non transferable between the players. To the first case refers the
Transferable utility games (TU-games) where the sum of all player payoff equals
the total utility generated by the collaboration, while in the non transferable utility
games (NTU games) the sum of all players payoff is not equal to the total utility
of the collaboration. Another distinction between the cooperative game approaches
has been individuated by [126] who defined the Core like and Value like approaches.
The former give a set of possible utility allocations for coalition members. These
allocations conform to some general properties of feasible solution, thus can be
considered as ”the set of more feasible propositions”. Since that Core like approaches
only propose a set of solutions, without identifying a specific proposition, they
usually serve as stability criterions. The Value like approaches, such as Shapley value
(SV), try to identify a specific allocation by a set of axioms, usually serve as allocation
rules.
The non cooperative game takes place if the commitments are not enforceable. In
this case players have contradiction on individual objects, such as in the ”zero sum
game”, where the gain (or loss) of a participant is exactly balanced by the loses (or
gains) of the other participants. In the present Thesis are not taken into account thus
the focus on carrier collaboration based on cooperative alliances.
The sharing of horizontal collaboration benefits could be achieved not only by
applying Game Theory allocation methods, but also adopting some optimization
schemes, as the one proposed in the present Thesis (5) where the aim of the total
coalition profit is foresees, respecting the fairness of cost distribution and the rise of
individual profit compared to the individual case. Furthermore the dimension of the
carrier alliance is not defined a priori but determined considering the coalition profit.
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4.1.7 Limits of collaboration
What about obstacles of logistic collaboration? As in every collaboration mechanism
also in the logistic trade there are some difficulties and obstacles that have to be
overcome to make reliable the cooperation. Barriers could be:
1. Finding suitable partners and establish detachable and at the same time flexible
rules to regulate entry and exit to collaboration based on trust spreading an
enterprise culture;
2. Finding a profit sharing mechanism that is commonly accepted by all the
members and is able to feel the differences in contribution to the coalition;
3. Finding an appropriate information sharing system to make all the members
aware of the trade situation;
4. Finding a legal way to regulate alliance from on organizational point of view and
insurance that cover all aspects of the collaboration
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4.2 Literature review on carrier cooperation
In the last years, the concept of cooperation among carriers has been gaining an
increasing attention in the logistic sector ([140], [112], [114]). As previously
described, cooperation can be realized in two different ways: vertical and horizontal
cooperation. Vertical cooperation takes place when two or more entities acting at
different levels of the logistic network (as instance, suppliers and manufacturers)
jointly plan some of their activities. horizontal cooperation, which is addressed in the
present Thesis, represents, instead, the collaboration between two or more firms that
are active at the same level of the supply chain [125].
The literature on horizontal cooperation in logistics is scarce. Cruijssen et al. [120]
provided a review of the existing literature regarding horizontal cooperation. Even
if horizontal cooperation is recognized to be a potential way for carriers to increase
their positioning in the market of logistic operations, its applications are still rare.
This can be due to the fact that participants are mainly guided by own self-interests
and they may not yet be aware of the value of cooperation, but, also, a lack of proper
collaboration models, especially for what concerns costs and gains distribution, plays
a role in the scarcity of cooperation experiences. Therefore, effective methods and
procedures to manage collaboration activities could enhance their applications.
Almost all works are focused on the quantification of potential cost savings through
collaboration and on the mechanisms to share benefits. Some of those methods are
based on simple proportional rules while others on theoretical concepts found in
game theory, most of them published in the last ten years. One of the first reviews
on basic cost allocation methods is [97], whereas one of the most recent works has
been proposed by [143] who classified articles according to five types of problems
on collaborative transportation: transportation planning, traveling salesman, vehicle
routing, joint distribution and inventory related problems.
The majority of works to solve cost allocation are based on linear optimization
programming (LP) and [98] proved that a stable cost allocation, able to distribute
the total cost, could be computed from an optimal solution to the dual of the LP.
These results are further extended in [99] in which the correspondence of every
such cost allocation to an optimal dual solution for a flow game over a simple
network is established. [100] and [101] generalized this result and extended it to
some LP games that include the games in which this correspondence is known
to exist. In [117] and [118] a two steps method to divide the profit gained from
the fulfillment of the requests among collaborating carriers is proposed. [111]
extended the conventional routing of owned vehicles by introducing subcontracting,
simultaneously constructing fulfillment plans with overall lowest costs using the own
fleet and subcontractors vehicles.
The above mentioned works refer to decentralized decision schemes; another piece
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of work deals with a centralized approach, in which a third party (for instance a
logistic provider) takes the responsibility of allocating costs and profits. In [124]
the authors studied the network flow from a centralized point of view, in which
networks and carrier requests are merged into a big pseudo-carrier. The allocation
profit is built on the capacity exchange price, which means that a carrier receives
payments for its capacities used by other carriers. In [133] a centralized entity
is responsible for minimizing the total costs of carriers. The attractiveness of the
centralized cooperation paradigm is justified by the significant increase of capacity
utilization and decrease of empty haul trips. Other works study the applicability
of cooperative GT properties and propose computational procedures for finding
proper allocations. [108] and [109] studied transportation games where buyers and
sellers are disjoint sets; [104] considered continuous and discrete network synthesis
games. The problem of finding efficient routes, paths and tours able to minimize
asset repositioning costs in a collaborative truckload transportation network has
been studied by [103], [123]. In these papers some optimization problems with
side constraints (such as temporal and driver restrictions) are formulated and some
heuristic algorithms are proposed for solving them. [144] studied the optimization
of a collaboration scheme among carriers in an arc routing problem with multiple
depots. The optimization problem is composed of two phases: in the former the total
profit is maximized while in the latter a lower bound on the individual profit of each
carrier is identified.
The problem of determining the size of a coalition has, instead, been studied in
different sectors apart from logistics: in [107] Axelrod et al. present a theory for
predicting how business firms form alliances in the computer science business. They
assume that the utility of a firm for joining a particular alliance increases with the size
of the alliance and decreases with the presence of rivals in the alliance. Adrian and
Press ([102]) defined eight decision costs related to the formation of a coalition in
a political system: information, responsibility costs, intergame, division of payoffs,
dissonance, inertia costs, time and persuasion costs.
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Chapter 5
Multiple trips combination and
carriers collaboration: optimization
model proposed
In this chapter, the problem of horizontal cooperation between a certain number
of road carriers is addressed. The problem has been tackled in this Thesis by
defining two phases: an optimization phase devoted to the definition of the best
way of performing trips and a second phase in which a suitable way of defining and
managing the coalition is addressed. More in detail, once individuated the optimal
combinations of trips in section 3.4 for maximizing total cost savings, a second
mathematical model, in section 5.1, is defined and applied to properly assign possible
combined trips to carriers and, finally, in a third step the most adequate coalition in
terms of number of participants is chosen with the aim of maximizing the profit when
introducing costs related to the management of the coalition.
In section 5.4 the same problem of profit maximization of carriers’ alliances is solved
applying Game Theory Methods.
The results obtained in both sections are similar but not coincident, underling the
fairness of the allocation models proposed and the fact that in all cases collaboration
brings to carriers higher profits than the stand alone situation.
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5.1 The optimization phase
Several road transportation carriers are supposed to form a coalition in which they
share trips to be served in a common area. Trips belonging to different carriers of
the coalition are optimally combined and assigned to the carriers with the final goal
of maximizing the total coalition profit. Moreover, the coalition profit is improved
by determining the best coalition size, taking into account management coalition
costs. The fact of performing trips in combinations instead of singularly, besides
optimizing carrier profits, allows to decrease negative externalities such as pollution
and congestion, thanks to the reduction of empty trips on road networks.
In the considered framework, trips are characterized by an origin, a destination, a
duration (proportional to the distance to be covered) and a duedate to be respected.
As regards carriers, a unitary management cost, which reflects the organizational
structure of the company, its fixed costs and other factors, is defined together with
a unitary income for realizing trips. According to such terms, trips combinations
are assigned to carriers. Moreover, a fixed management cost is associated with each
coalition size. This cost is assumed to be linearly proportional to the coalition size,
assuming that it is more onerous to manage a bigger rather than a smaller coalition.
To sum up, the proposed optimization scheme is composed of the following three
phases. (Fig. 5.1).
- Phase 1: trips are optimally combined with the goal of maximizing the total
cost savings for performing them. The result of this first optimization problem is
a certain number of trip combinations having different lengths and maybe some
single trips (i.e. the ones which remain uncombined). Note that in this first phase
the property of trips is neglected. Results of this phase are presented in section
3.5.
- Phase 2: the combined trips obtained as output from the previous phase are
assigned to carriers with the goal of maximizing the coalition profit. In this step
the size of the carrier coalition is fixed.
- Phase 3: in order to define the best carrier coalition size, the optimization
problem of phase 2 is performed for different coalition dimensions. Finally,
the coalition size that maximizes the total carriers’ profit is chosen.
Once solved Problem 3.4.1, the best trip combinations are determined and gathered
in set C. In the second phase of the proposed optimization scheme, a second
mathematical problem is applied in order to assign combined trips to carriers. Note
that single trips are not considered in this second optimization phase because they are
assumed to be executed by the carrier they belong to. Before presenting this second
mathematical formulation, let us introduce the following additional notation:
- R is the set of carriers;
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Figure 5.1: Optimization Scheme proposed
- cr, r ∈ R, is the unitary cost of carrier r for performing its trips. It is expressed
in euro/km;
- er, r ∈ R, is the unitary earning of carrier r for performing trips. It is expressed
in euro/km;
- T r ⊂ T , r ∈ R, is the set of trips initially belonging to carrier r;
- nr, r ∈ R, is the number of trucks available for carrier r to execute trip
combinations. It is different for each scenario considered;
- Dc, c ∈ C, is a parameter representing the eventual delay cost to be sustained
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when executing combination c; It is defined as Dc = cd
∑l(c)
i=1 max
(
fvi(c) −
hvi(c), 0
)
;
- Src , r ∈ R, c ∈ C, is the profit of carrier r for executing trip combination c;
- Sr, r ∈ R, is the total profit for carrier r for performing trip combinations;
- Sr0 , r ∈ R, c ∈ C, is the initial profit of carrier r for executing trips t ∈ T r that
initially belong to him;
- G(U), u ∈ U is defined as the total gains of collaboration;
- u ∈ U are all the possible combinations of carrier alliances;
- γ is a parameter that takes into account the need of repositioning the empty
container at the end of the service when performing single trips. Note that in
some cases, the empty container is asked to be brought back to the origin node;
in this case the value of γ is 2.
The initial profit of each carrier is computed as
Sr0 =
∑
t∈T r
(
er − γcr)dt r ∈ R (5.1)
The decision variables of the second problem are represented by yrc , c ∈ C, r ∈ R,
that are binary variables assuming value equal to 1 if trip combination c is executed
by carrier r, 0 otherwise.
The second problem formulation follows.
Problem 2. Find the optimal values of variables yrc , c ∈ C, r ∈ R, in order to:
max
∑
u∈U
G(U) (5.2)
where: G(U) =
∑
r∈R(S
r − Sr0)
subject to:
Src = y
r
c
(
(er − cr)
l(c)∑
i=1
dvi(c) − cr
l(c)−1∑
i=1
vi(c),vi+1(c) −Dc
)
c ∈ C, r ∈ R (5.3)
Sr =
∑
c∈C
Src r ∈ R (5.4)
∑
r∈R
yrc = 1 c ∈ C (5.5)
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∑
c∈C
yrc ≤ nr r ∈ R (5.6)
yrc ∈ (0, 1) c ∈ C, r ∈ R (5.7)

The resulting problem is an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) problem in which the
objective function (5.2) minimizes the sum of the transport costs for performing trip
combinations plus a term reflecting the difference between the initial (Sr0) and final
(Sr) profit of each carrier. This last term has been added in order to penalize solutions
in which the final profit of one or more carriers is lower than the corresponding initial
profit. Constraints (5.3) and (5.4) define the initial and final profit of each carrier.
Constraints (5.5) ensure that each trip combination c is executed by only one carrier
r, while constraints (5.6) ensure that the maximum number of trips combination c that
each carrier can perform is not bigger than the maximum number of truck available
by the carrier. Finally, constraints (5.7) define the nature of the decision variables of
the problem.
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5.2 Determination of the coalition size
By optimally solving Problem 3.4.1 and Problem 5.1 it is possible to determine
the best trip combinations and, consequently, the highest total profit of the carriers
participating in a coalition. It is, then, possible to investigate what happens by
considering different coalitions of carriers and, specifically, coalitions in which the
number of participants changes. When dealing with such an issue, it is necessary to
consider that the larger is the number of participants to a coalition, the higher are the
costs needed to manage the coalition.
By defining a set of coalitions A, it is possible to associate with each element a of
the set, the optimal profit S¯◦a obtained by solving Problem 5.1 and a cost C¯a = caρa
related to the cost for managing the coalition. This cost linearly depends on the
number of participants to the coalition, ρa, a ∈ A, and by a unitary cost for the
coalition management ca.
Therefore, in this third phase, Problem 5.1 is solved several times by considering
different coalition sizes, so to determine the best coalition a◦ that further maximizes
the total coalition profit. This optimal coalition can be found by applying the
following formula:
argmaxa∈A
(
S¯◦a − C¯a
)
(5.8)
Of course, once determined the best coalition, it is straightforward to define the best
size for a coalition to face the proposed problem. In the next section an experimental
analysis based on a real case study is presented.
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5.3 Experimental Results
Once individuated the best trips combinations by applying model presented in section
3.4.1, the second model, described in 5.1, has been applied introducing truck carrier
operators to determine the best assignment to carriers. Various instances related to
different numbers of trips Thave been tested. For example, results obtained in the
instances T = 7, T = 17, T = 25, T = 30, are presented. The set of carriers
includes 5 carriers, that is, R = {A,B,C,D,E}. Each one of these instances has
been tested in the four scenarios S1÷ S4 (Table 3.6) described in 3.5.
Table 5.1 presents an extraction of data related to the trips in the second instance
(T = 17) from Table 3.4 in which the ID number, the origin, the destination, the
distance to be covered, the due-date to be respected and the carrier who originally
owns the trip before the collaboration process, are reported for each trip.
Table 5.1: Data related to trips in the second instance (T = 17)
Trip ] Typology Distance Time window Due-date Carrier
(km) (hour) (hour) owner
T-A T-A W-A D-A
1 imp 160 7 - 12 /15 - 18 15 A
2 inl 41 7 - 13 /15 - 18 18 B
3 exp 178 8 - 13/15 - 18 18 C
4 imp 133 7 - 12/16 - 20 17 A
5 inl 50 8 - 13/15 - 18 15 C
6 inl 64 8 - 13/14 - 18 14 D
7 inl 80 8 - 12/15 - 20 15 C
8 inl 28 8 - 13/15 - 18 18 E
9 inl 70 8 - 13/14 - 18 18 C
10 inl 75 8 - 13/15 - 18 16 E
11 exp 116 8 - 13/15 - 19 18 B
12 inl 74 8 - 13/15 - 18 18 D
13 inl 49 9 - 13/14 - 19 18 C
14 inl 52 8 - 13/15 - 18 20 D
15 inl 38 8 - 13/15 - 18 18 A
16 inl 60 8 - 13/15 - 18 18 E
17 imp 140 8 - 12/15 - 20 18 A
Results obtained by applying Problem 5.1 are summarized in Table 5.2. For all the
carriers the unitary earning er has been set equal to 1, while the unitary costs of
transport cr have been set equal to 0.8, 0.9, 0.9, 0.8, 0.9 for carriers A,B,C,D,E,
respectively.
Comparing individual carriers profits in the different scenarios is confirmed the
tendency already described in 3.5, where, when node time windows and trip due
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Table 5.2: Trips assignment to carriers (S1)
r Sr0 S
r
c %of sav.
ρa = 3 ρa = 4 ρa = 5 ρa = 3 ρa = 4 ρa = 5 n
r
1
A 70 89 76 72 21% 8% 3% 4
B 68 91 78 71 25% 13% 4% 4
C 63 95 66 64 34% 5% 2% 3
D 53 - 55 53 - 4% 0% 3
E 46 - - 47 - - 2% 3
Stot 300 275 275 307 27% 8% 8%
2
A 150 175 171 170 14% 12% 12% 5
B 145 181 165 151 20% 12% 4% 5
C 145 194 163 149 25% 11% 3% 4
D 126 - 148 140 - 15% 10% 3
E 118 - - 121 - - 2% 3
Stot 684 550 647 731 20% 13% 6%
3
A 219 258 294 316 15% 26% 31% 6
B 228 285 325 336 20% 30% 32% 5
C 204 244 258 305 16% 21% 33% 5
D 217 - 236 230 - 8% 6% 4
E 239 - - 241 - - 1% 3
Stot 1107 787 1113 1428 17% 22% 22%
4
A 487 576 608 649 15% 20% 25% 6
B 498 584 625 658 15% 20% 24% 5
C 479 501 629 624 4% 24% 23% 5
D 490 - 585 593 - 16% 17% 4
E 498 - - 622 - - 20% 4
Stot 2452 1661 2447 3146 12% 20% 22%
to dates are more restrictive (S3 and S4) also individual lower profits are generated.
Figure 5.2 shows this scenario comparison in the case of ρa = 3.
In Table 5.2 is possible to analyze the results obtained growing the dimension of
carrier alliances. Results are reported for the scenario 1 case, in terms of initial profit
of each carrier Sr0 and final profit obtained by applying collaboration S
r, and the
relative % of profit for the 5 instances considering coalitions of carriers with growing
dimensions (with ρa = 3, ρa = 4 and ρa = 5).
It is possible to see that in case of small trip sets, as it is the first instances, that
is composed of only 7 trips, the highest savings are obtained by applying a small
coalition (ρa = 3). For instances 2, that has 17 trips, the difference in terms of
profits for alliances of 3 and 4 carriers is less big that the one for the first instance.
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Figure 5.2: Comparison between scenarios S1 and S3, and scenarios S2 and S3 for the set of
T = 7, 17, 25, 30 trips, with the growing size of collaboration alliance ρa = 3, 4, 5
Nevertheless profits in the case with ρa = 5 are still lower than the one obtained for
ρa = 3, 4 . Instead for instances 3, that has 25 trips, results show that a carrier alliance
of 4 members is more profitable. For instances 4 the highest profits are obtained by
applying a coalition with ρa = 5. This trend is in line with the fact that the higher
is the number of trips to be served, the higher is the need to distribute them between
more carriers in order to produce a profitable service both for each carrier and for the
whole set. It is also visible in fig.5.3, where the total coalition profit increase with the
dimension of the coalition: small trip sets (i.e. 7 trips) obtain higher profit for small
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Figure 5.3: Total collaboration profit for the set of T = 7, 17, 25, 30 trips, with the growing size
of collaboration alliance ρa = 3, 4, 5
carrier alliances (ρa = 3), instead big trip sets (i.e. 30 trips) register higher profits
with big carrier alliances (ρa = 5)
To justify this tendency and to properly size the coalition, Problem 5.1 has been
applied for each coalition type (ρa = 3, ρa = 4, ρa = 5) by varying the value of
the management cost of the coalition. This has been done for all the five scenarios
considered.
In Table 5.3 the results for the different scenarios are summarized. Reading values in
rows, it is possible to see that, keeping the same number of trips but increasing the
value of the unitary costs, the dimension of the carrier alliance decreases.
Instead, reading values in columns, it comes out that keeping the same value of the
unitary costs and increasing the number of trips considered, the dimension of the
carrier alliance increases. This tendency is straightforward since the bigger is the set
of trips to be served, the higher is the number of carriers that form the best coalition.
Of course this is due to the structure of the above determined profits and that the cost
for managing the coalition is chosen as a linear cost proportionally increasing with
the coalition size.
As regards the computational load of the proposed optimization scheme, the
computational times are lower than 100 seconds for each scenario analyzed.
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Table 5.3: Dimension of carrier alliances in function of T and ca
T ca
10 20 30 50
4 3 3 3 3
17 4 3 3 3
32 4 4 4 4
61 5 5 4 4
100 5 5 5 5
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5.4 Application of Game Theory Methods for profit
allocation
In section 5.1 the best trips combination identified in 3.4 have been allocated to
carriers, maximizing their profits, applying the ad hoc method proposed by the
present Thesis. To complete the analysis, the same problem has been solved applying
GT methods in order to validate results obtained.
5.4.1 Game theory glossary
Before presenting the results obtained can be useful report a brief glossary of the
Game Theory.
A cooperative game is an ordered pair < R;φ > where R = {1, 2.., r} is the set of
players and φ : U → R is a function that assigns to each coalition u ∈ U = 2N a
real number and such that φ(0) = 0. φ is said ”characteristic function” of the game,
and φ(u) is said value of the coalition u ∈ U . Often φ(u) is called ”saved cost”
for the coalition u and traditionally it is computed as the difference between the cost
corresponding to the situation where all the members of s work alone and the cost
related to the situation where all members of s work together. In our approach, it is
calculated as the difference between the profit of the coalition s obtainable thanks to
the collaboration and the profit of each member of s working alone, that is,
φ(u) = G(u)−
∑
r∈s
p(r) ∀u ∈ U (5.9)
Moreover, a vector ξ ∈ Rn is said imputation if:
- ξ is individual rational (IR) i.e.:
ξr ≥ φ(r) ∀r ∈ R (5.10)
- ξ is efficient (EFF) i.e.:
φ(R)
∑
r∈R
ξr = φ(R) (5.11)
Equation (5.10) states that the profit of the grand coalition R is split among its
members according to the imputation ξ. The second equation (5.11) states that there
is no subset u of players such that, should they form a coalition separately from the
rest, they would perceive less total profit than the total profit allocated to them by ξ.
Some definitions follow:
Definition 1 (super additive). A game G =< R;φ > is super-additive if the value
function φ satisfies equation (5.12):
φ(U) + φ(H) ≤ φ(U +H) (5.12)
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in a super-additive game the value of the union of two distinct coalitions is great at
least as the sum of the sub-coalitions taken separately. Therefore in a super-additive
game it is not convenient to break a coalition in parts.
Definition 2 (sub additive). A game G =< R;φ > is sub-additive if G =< R;φ >
is super-additive.
Definition 3 (additive). A game G =< R;φ > is additive if the value function φ
satisfies equation (5.13):
φ(U) + φ(H) = φ(U) + φ(H), U ∪H = 0 (5.13)
Definition 4 (Convex). A game G =< R;φ > is convex if the value function phi is
super modular.
φ(U) + φ(H) ≤ φ(U ∩H) + φ(U ∪H), ∀U,H ⊆ N (5.14)
Definition 5 (Super modular). A game G =< R;φ > is super modular if the value
function φ is equivalent to:
φ(U ∪ i)− φ(U) ≤ φ(H ∪ i)− φ(H), ∀U ⊆ H ⊆ ∀i,∈ N (5.15)
That means the incentives for joining a coalition increase as the coalition grows.
In this thesis some of the main cooperative GT solution concepts are applied, they
are, in particular, Core, Nucleolus, Shapley Value, and methods based on marginal or
separable and non separable costs. In the standard applications of such methods the
distribution of costs is considered, in this thesis instead the distribution of profits is
analyzed. In the following the main concepts adopted are defined.
- Core. The set C of stable imputations is called ”Core” and defined as:
C =
{
(ξ1, .., ξn) :
∑
r∈R
ξr = φ(R)
and
∑
r∈s
ξr ≥ φ(u), ∀s ∈ S
}
(5.16)
The Core is the set of all allocations that share out the cost savings in the grand
coalition and make every coalition and individual get more than they can achieve
by deviating from the grand coalition.
Nevertheless the Core of some games may be empty, as proved by Shapley in
1971. The Core of a game is non-empty only if the coalition formed is the
optimal one. ”Optimal” means this coalition can generate highest global cost
savings. In the sense of the coalition Core stability, the optimal is the most stable.
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Even if the coalition Core is empty, in considering that the optimal coalition
can achieve the highest global cost saving, which leaves more leeway for the
side payment aiming at a global acceptable solution, it is more stable than other
coalitions.
- Nucleolus is a measure of the inequity of an imputation ξ for a coalition s and is
defined in form of excess:
e(ξ, s) = φ(u)−
∑
r∈s
ξr (5.17)
Equation (5.17) measures the quantity (i.e. the size of inequity) of distance from its
potential φ(u) for the allocation ξ in coalition s. Since the Core is defined as the set of
imputations such that
∑
r∈s ξr ≥ φ(u) for all coalitions s, it results that an imputation
ξ is in the Core if, and only if, all its excesses are negative or zero.
- The Shapley Value ψ(φ) of the game < R;φ > is defined as a function that
assigns to each possible characteristic function of a r-person game φ, a r-tuple,
ψ(φ) = (ψ1(φ), ψ2(φ), ..., ψr(φ)) of real numbers. Here ψ(φ) represents the
worth or value of player r in the game with the characteristic function φ.
Ψ(φ) =
1
r!
∑
σ∈Π(R)
mσσ(r)(φ) (5.18)
where Π(R) denotes the set of permutations of N and the marginal vectors mσ(φ)
correspond to a situation in which players enter in a room one-by-one in the order
(σ(1), σ(2)..., σ(n)) and where to each player it is assigned the marginal contribution
that he gets when he enters.
Pσ(r) is the set of predecessors of r in σ.
mσσ(r)(φ) = Ψ(Pσ(σ(r)) ∪ {σ(r)})−Ψ(Pσ(σ(r)) (5.19)
The axioms of fairness are placed on the function Ψ(φ):
1 Efficiency (5.11).
2 Symmetry. If r and j are such that φ(s ∪ r) = φ(s ∪ j) for every coalition s not
containing r and j, then Ψr(φ) = Ψj(φ).
3 Dummy Axiom. If r is such that φ(u) = φ(u ∪ r) for every coalition u not
containing r, then Ψr(φ) = 0.
4 Additivity. If u and v are characteristic functions, then Ψ(u+v) = Ψu + φv.
- Method based on marginal or separable and non separable savings. Given
a game, the marginal saving of player r is called “separable saving” and defined
as
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mr = φ(R)− φ(R− r) (5.20)
If the saving sum is lower than the total saving game, the difference between the two
values is called “non separable saving”:
Γ(N) = φ(R)−
∑
r∈R
mr (5.21)
There are different methods to allocate this non separable saving Γ(R):
1 Equal Profit Allocation (EPA) This method equally allocates the profits among
all the members of the coalition:
ξr = mr + Γ(R)
1
r
(5.22)
2 Alternative Cost Saving (ACS) Non separable saving is allocated proportionally
to the saving obtained by each member of the coalition having gained own
separable profit instead of the individual profit. So it comes:
savr = φr −mr (5.23)
and then,
ξr = mr + Γ(R)
savr∑
r∈R savr
(5.24)
3 Profit Gap (PGA) This method allocates the profit proportionally to the best
maximum contribution that each player is willing to give for being part of a
coalition. So the non separable profit of a coalition s is defined as:
Γ(s) = φ(u)−
∑
r∈s
mr (5.25)
Player r is willing to pay at most the minimum non separable profit of the
coalition of which he could be member. Imposing, gr = min{g(s)|r ∈ s},
ξr is computed as follows:
ξr = mr + Γ(N)
gr∑
r∈R gr
(5.26)
The methods described above are implemented and compared in the following section
with reference to a specific example. Specifically, in the present thesis, the above
described profit allocation methods have been applied in order to highlight quantified
and easily understandable value of profits for carriers. These results show the
potential of collaboration and incentive companies to form coalitions.
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5.5 Experimental Results
The models described in 3.4 and in 5.1 have been implemented and solved
considering different experimental factors to represent a variety of different problem
conditions:
- the number of carriers that can collaborate, forming collations of 2,3,4.. carriers;
- the number of trips to be performed (i.e 7,9,11..);
- the original property of trips;
At first, the optimization problem 3.4 has been solved to identify the best trip
combinations for different settings u, and the corresponding profit G(u) and value
functions φ(u) have been computed. Then, for each instance tested, the related
profit allocations have been calculated by using the methods described in the previous
section.
Table 5.4: Profit and Value function obtained from collaboration of 3 carriers
Carr. Value 7 trips 17 trips 25 trips 30 trips
A G(u) 70 150 219 487
φ(u) 0 0 0 0
B G(u) 68 145 228 498
φ(u) 0 0 0 0
C G(u) 63 145 204 479
φ(u) 0 0 0 0
AB G(u) 167 325 495 1360
φ(u) 29 30 48 375
AC G(u) 170 319 480 1345
φ(u) 37 45 57 379
BC G(u) 175 296 475 1309
φ(u) 44 27 43 332
ABC G(u) 475 978 1489 3005
φ(u) 274 559 838 1541
For instance, in Table 5.4 the total profit G(u) and the value of each collaboration
setting φ(u) are provided for four scenarios that differ for the total number of trips
considered (i.e. 7, 17, 25 and 30) in the case of ρ = 3. In Fig. 5.4 is visible how the
value of each collaboration setting φ(u) increase with the dimension of trip set and
of the carrier alliance.
The computational time necessary to solve the optimization problems related to the
three scenarios of ρa is very small and is always lower than 0.05 seconds , 0.08
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Figure 5.4: Value function trend for the different trip set T and ρa = 3, 4, 5 carriers
seconds, and 0.17 seconds in the three cases, respectively. It can be seen that,
considering equation (5.9), if carriers A,B,C operate independently, φ(u) is zero,
while in the collaborations settings AB,AC,BC,ABC it results that v(s) > 0
because the respective G(u) are higher than the individual profits. Considering the
results obtained, φ(u) increases as the size of the coalition grows, with the largest
value corresponding to the grand coalition case ABC.
In Table 5.5 the individual profits of each carrier before and after the collaboration
are compared, again for each scenario considered (i.e. 7, 17, 25 and 30 trips). By
observing Table 5.5 it can be noted that each carrier profit increases thanks to the
collaboration. By increasing the number of trips merged (highlighted in columns),
profits increase as well. This property also reflects in the profit distribution between
the carriers joining the alliance.
For what concerns the different allocation methods that have been tested, the results
obtained are similar but not coincident; there are some little differences that reflect
the possibility of having one or more acceptable solutions in the core and a different
definition of fairness in each mechanism.
It can also be noted that, considering an initial balanced trips assignment (binary
parameter Zrc ), cost savings are similar for all carriers. If the initial assignment of
trips is unbalanced, i.e. almost all trips originally belong to only one carrier, the
profit allocation is different and is influenced by such original assignment. As shown
in Table 5.6, if carrier A originally owns the majority of trips, the collaboration may
impose him to serve a lower number of trips compared to the ones previously owned,
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Table 5.5: Profit Allocation Comparison
Car. trips Pre Co. Shap. EPA ACS PGA Nuc.
A
7 70.0 87.7 84.0 88.5 84.0 84.0
17 150 189.8 193.3 188.8 193.3 193.3
25 219 282.5 285.7 281.6 285.7 285.7
30 487 528.7 543.7 526.7 543.7 543.7
B
7 68 91.3 91.0 91.3 91.0 91.0
17 145 180.0 175.3 182,4 175.3 175.3
25 228 275.5 271.7 276.6 271.7 271.7
30 498 505.2 496.7 506.3 496.7 496.7
C
7 63 95.2 99.0 94.3 99.0 99.0
17 145 188.3 190.3 188.7 190.3 190.3
25 204 280.0 280.7 279.8 280.7 280.7
30 479 507.2 500.7 508.0 500.7 500.7
so gaining proportionally less compared to the other carriers. On the contrary, carriers
B and C would be assigned more trips and consequently would gain more. So, in
this case the cooperation would result more convenient for carriers B and C than for
carrier A.
Table 5.6: Profit Allocation with A owning the majority of trips
Car. trips Pre Co. Shap. EPA ACS PGA Nuc.
A
7 80.0 80.6 80.4 80.5 80.0 80.0
17 197.0 207.8 200.3 200.2 212.4 212.4
25 306 312.2 315.5 312.5 310.2 310.2
30 608 610.5 613.4 614.5 613.5 613.5
B
7 68 100.1 120.0 121.3 120.0 121.2
17 135 180.0 180.3 180.4 185.3 185.2
25 228 284.0 283.7 273.6 281.7 281.7
30 433 505.2 496.7 506.3 496.7 496.7
C
7 50.0 115.2 120.0 124.3 124.0 124.0
17 110 190 192.3 198.7 196.0 196.3
25 180 295.2 292.7 290.8 291.5 291.6
30 400 510.1 510.7 505.0 508.4 508.4
Finally, in table 5.7 is presented the comparison between the mathematical model
proposed in this Thesis and the Game Theory Methods. Results are presented for
different set of carrier alliances, varying the dimension of ρa, and of the trip set
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T , in terms of % increase of profit Sr. It can be stated, that, when deciding how
to share carrier profits, it is hard to say which allocation mechanism is better than
the others, because they provide similar results. This underlines the fairness of such
allocation methods and the fact that collaboration is definitely convenient for carriers.
In practice, a method may be chosen based on an agreement between carriers before
the collaboration starts.
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Table 5.7: Comparative analysis among profit allocation schemes
Trip Car. Initial Ad hoc met.(%) Shapley (%) EPA(%) ACS(%) PGA(%)
# Profit ρa = 3 ρa = 4 ρa = 5 ρa = 3 ρa = 4 ρa = 5 ρa = 3 ρa = 4 ρa = 5 ρa = 3 ρa = 4 ρa = 5 ρa = 3 ρa = 4 ρa = 5
Sr0 S
r Sr Sr Sr Sr Sr Sr Sr Sr(%) Sr Sr Sr Sr Sr Sr
A 70 21 8 3 20 9 3 19 10 3 20 10 3 17 9 3
B 68 25 13 4 25 12 4 25 13 3 25 13 2 25 12 3
C 63 34 5 2 34 6 2 36 7 2 33 6 1 36 8 2
7 D 53 - 4 1 - 5 1 - 4 0 - 5 1 - 5 1
E 53 - - 2 - - 1 - - 2 - - 2 - - 1
Stot 300 27 7 2 26 8 2 27 9 2 26 9 2 26 9 2
A 153 14 12 12 15 11 11 13 12 11 12 11 11 14 11 11
B 158 20 12 4 20 12 4 19 12 3 19 12 2 17 13 5
C 144 25 11 3 23 11 3 24 11 3 21 11 2 24 12 2
17 D 142 - 15 10 - 14 10 - 13 10 - 12 9 - 9 8
E 150 - - 2 - - 2 - - 1 - - 1 - - 1
Stot 136 20 13 6 19 12 6 19 16 2 17 12 5 18 11 5
A 219 19 26 31 20 26 31 21 26 31 22 27 30 23 26 29
B 228 20 30 32 19 31 32 20 29 32 18 29 33 16 30 31
C 204 22 21 33 22 20 32 23 21 32 23 20 32 22 19 32
25 D 217 - 8 16 - 9 11 - 9 10 - 10 10 - 9 9
E 239 - - 5 - - 2 - - 2 - - 1 - - 1
Stot 1107 20 21 23 20 22 22 21 21 21 21 22 21 20 21 20
A 487 15 20 25 14 20 25 10 19 24 13 18 24 10 18 24
B 498 15 20 24 13 20 23 12 11 23 14 15 23 13 13 25
C 479 4 24 23 6 23 24 4 20 24 6 21 19 4 21 22
30 D 490 - 16 17 - 16 18 - 15 19 - 16 16 - 15 18
E 498 - - 20 - - 19 - - 19 - - 18 - - 19
Stot 2452 12 20 22 11 20 22 9 16 22 11 18 20 9 17 22
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this Thesis, the possibility to apply horizontal collaboration between truck carrier
operators has been analyzed with the purpose of reducing inefficiencies and increase
carrier’s profits, thus limiting negative externalities to the community, such as
congestion and environmental pollution.
Applying collaboration schemes in a selfish environment as the road carriers is, is
more than challenging, but it should be one of the few solutions able to reduce or
even better to stop the failure of the sector.
Although in the present thesis the focus is the horizontal collaboration between truck
carriers the horizon of collaboration should be extended to all stakeholders of logistic
chain of transport of goods (vertical collaboration).
To deal with the goal, an optimization approach has been applied with the objective
of maximizing the cost saving of a coalition of road freight transportation carriers
sharing their demands. This goal is pursued by combining trips together in the same
route, by suitably reassigning combined trips to carriers and by properly sizing the
carriers coalition dimension.
The optimization scheme proposed is composed of three steps:
The first phase of the proposed scheme combines multiple trips in order to maximize
cost savings, performing all trips, taking into account specific constraints, such as the
driving hour restrictions of truck drivers, independently from the original ownership
of the trips. As a consequence, trip combinations allow to reduce the number of
empty trips performed and, so, to gain environmental and road congestion benefits.
Different approaches have been formulated, implemented and compared on different
instances and scenarios, by varying the typology of trips, trip due-dates and node
time windows. Real data provided by transportation companies that operate in the
hinterland of the Italian ports of Genoa, Savona and La Spezia have been used to test
the proposed optimization schemes. The results obtained have shown that the variable
size case is the most effective one. Its superiority towards the other approaches is
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twofold: it allows to maximize the total cost savings by reducing the number and
length of empty trips, and, also, it optimizes truck utilization since the number of
routes needed to fulfill the whole trip demand is significantly reduced. Furthermore,
the variable size case proved to be the most effective method in terms of CPU time
for computing the optimal solution. The interesting results obtained - both in terms
of cost savings and truck usage - appear to be useful both for the business sector,
i.e. truck companies, and for the social community. Moreover, the simplicity of the
proposed mathematical optimization model allows real carriers to simply implement
and use it. This is particularly beneficial for small-sized operators - that correspond to
the majority of the market - which neither are familiar with mathematical techniques
nor can afford big investments in technology.
The second phase assigns the combinations found at the first step to carriers with
the goal of maximizing the coalition profit. To achieve this goal, have been applied
two profit distribution strategies: firstly has been proposed an original optimization
method able to properly assign profits to carriers by the assignment of trips, taking
into account the original property of the trips; secondly, to validate this approach,
Game Theory methods of profit sharing have been applied.
The two first phases are realized through the solution of ad-hoc optimization
problems having the structure of a MILP and an ILP, respectively.
Finally, to properly size the coalition, the second original optimization problem
is solved several times by considering different coalitions in order to find out the
coalition type that further maximizes the total profit. In this phase, a coalition
management cost, depending on the number of carriers acting in the coalition, is
considered.
Experimental results applied to a real case study have illustrated the benefits of
the collaboration to maximize both individual and total carriers’ profit. It can be
noted that the results of the last phase of the proposed scheme are influenced by
the type of coalition costs adopted. The simple case in which these costs have
a linear structure has been considered. The obtained results are promising but
quite straightforward. This suggests to try different (maybe more realistic) cost
structures as, for instance, piecewise affine concave structures, or structures including
a saturation term. This is the objective of present research in which, the same
optimization scheme is maintained and only the last step is varied (by considering
different costs). Furthermore, experimental results have clearly illustrated the
effectiveness of the collaboration schemes both from the global and individual profit
maximization points of view. In addition, all the allocation methods proposed, both
the GT methods and the original mathematical formulation, present quite similar
results that underline the fairness of such methods confirming that collaboration is
always convenient rather than individual approaches.
The way forward
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To conclude this Thesis it is necessary to point out some limitations to the
collaboration that should be overcome. The reasons identified were in two main
areas that impact each other strongly:
1. lack of structures and nurturing culture for suitable communication and
collaborative work between different industry organizations;
2. IT practices and systems that are insufficient to support collaborative work that
is effective in improving productivity.
There are only few examples of structures capable of fostering required levels of
contact, trust and transparency for effective collaboration across organizations with
the objective to improve revenues. This collaboration structure should be extended
to all the port stakeholders to better define and follow common objectives. Once
more, to be effective, there is the need to have the integrity to manage and disperse
information and data that may be important for productivity improvement but also
may be considered commercially sensitive. Linked to data management should
also be defined platforms and tools to manage complexity, handle potentially large
quantities of data, and allocate and apply that data in the correct manner have
a central role. Such platforms and tools need to be capable of sharing data in
an automated fashion while ensuring proper handling of sensitive elements. The
collection, management and sharing of data in a timely and purposeful manner as
a key to be improved to enhance collaboration. In the current business culture,
ownership and control of data frequently is seen as a competitive advantage and there
is a dominant fear that sharing it could expose companies to more commercial risk as
well as undermine negotiating positions by revealing weaknesses or strengths.
Closely related to the issues around data, adoption of and adherence to IT best
practice isn’t common in truck carrier companies today, limiting opportunities for
transparency and collaboration and large-scale innovation.
Attributed apathy toward working together to improve productivity to a perception of
diffused value or value that is not directly attributable or equally shared. A spread fear
is that some key participants in collaborative projects may input considerable effort
and resources toward improving productivity but a larger share of the benefits of the
work may go elsewhere. This is a key aspect faced on this Thesis: every participants
of the collaboration take part in a different way and for this reason, also revenue and
costs are distributed in the proper way.
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